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“100 PERCENT RENEWABLE”:
COMPANY PLEDGES AND STATE ENERGY LAW
Uma Outka*
Abstract
Corporate demand for clean power emerged with new force and
influence in postelection energy policy. As the Trump Administration
decisively reemphasized fossil fuels, leading companies countered by
pledging to power their operations with renewable energy. This Article
assesses recent regulatory reforms at the state level responsive to these
corporate pledges and considers the barriers and opportunities the
reforms present for companies, for states, and for emissions reduction
goals. It traces how corporate energy purchasing has evolved and how
new policy innovations are extending that trajectory across a growing
number of states. With a focus on reforms expanding access to renewable
energy in states with traditional regulatory regimes, the Article situates
the role of corporate demand for clean power in the broader context of
energy transition policy. What risks or benefits might there be if policy
shifts increase the role of corporate consumers in the U.S. electric power
sector? Recognizing the trend’s potential for carbon emissions reduction,
the Article considers how corporate demand for clean power is changing
the role of commercial and industrial consumers on the modern grid and
unpacks “100% renewable” claims. Turning to electricity’s legal and
physical infrastructure, the Article weighs implications of increased
nonutility influence and dispersed decision-making in energy policy.
INTRODUCTION
Five years ago, Google made headlines for pledging to buy enough renewable
energy to match 100 percent of the electricity its operations consume. 1 For a
*
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1
GOOGLE, ACHIEVING OUR 100% RENEWABLE ENERGY PURCHASING GOAL AND
GOING BEYOND 1 (2016), https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//
green/pdf/achieving-100-renewable-energy-purchasing-goal.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8MXHVA].
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company like Google, with data centers around the world that run twenty-four hours
a day, the carbon footprint from electricity is massive. In 2017, the company
announced it had reached its goal, buying 2.6 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy
to correspond with its global electricity consumption.2
In reaching this goal, Google celebrated its status as “the largest corporate
renewable energy buyer on the planet,” but the company is not alone in this
ambition.3 Alongside Google are other big-name corporations—such as Facebook,
Amazon, Microsoft, and IKEA—seeking low-cost renewable energy and other
means to reduce their energy use.4 These companies garner attention for their size
and brand recognition, but the demand is not limited to the big names. A survey of
companies in 2016 indicated over 70 percent of respondents were actively working
to acquire clean energy. 5 This corresponds with trends in U.S. stockholder proposals
this year, over half of which addressed climate and other environmental concerns.6
Corporate demand for clean power emerged with force and influence in
postelection energy policy as a counterweight to the Trump Administration’s
decisive reemphasis of fossil fuels. States have been regrouping in the wake of the
near-miss Clean Power Plan, the high-profile Obama Administration rule to limit
carbon emissions from power plants. As some of electric utilities’ largest customers,
companies that want access to renewable energy are in a position—absent regulatory
barriers—to drive renewable energy development with the scale of their demand.
Some, in frustration with regulatory barriers, have sought ways to produce utilityscale electricity on their own.
Although access to renewable energy is desirable for many companies, the law
of most states has allowed only circuitous linkages between corporate customers and
renewable energy producers. Acrobatic legal arrangements have bypassed some of
these barriers, but only for the biggest corporate consumers. Legal reform in this
area warrants attention, not just so individual companies can operate more costeffectively and responsibly – more importantly, the demand has potential to
2

Id.
Id.
4
For discussion of this demand, see infra Section II.B.
5
MEISTER CONSULTANTS GROUP, ADVANCED ENERGY ECON. INST., OPPORTUNITIES
TO INCREASE CORPORATE ACCESS TO ADVANCED ENERGY: A NATIONAL BRIEF 4 (2016)
[hereafter AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES], https://info.aee.net/opportunities-to-increase-corporateaccess-to-advanced-energy-report [https://perma.cc/S5EE-S5NX]; see also WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND ET AL., POWER FORWARD 3.0: HOW THE L ARGEST U.S. COMPANIES ARE
CAPTURING BUSINESS VALUE WHILE ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2017),
https://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/power-forward-3-0-how-the-largest-us-compan
ies-are-capturing-business-value-while-addressing-climate-change [https://perma.cc/BVD3
-6MZH] (finding 63% of Fortune 100 companies and 44% of Fortune 500 companies had
set “targets to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG), improve energy efficiency, and/or increase
renewable energy sourcing”).
6
James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Climate-Change Proposals Break
Through, PROXY MONITOR, http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2017Finding1.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UMY8-XWWF].
3
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accelerate the low-carbon energy transition. The Advanced Energy Economy
Institute estimates nearly 450 GW of renewable energy could be developed—
quadrupling wind and solar capacity in the U.S.—by meeting half the nation’s
commercial and industrial electricity demand with renewable electric power.7 With
commercial and industrial customers accounting for over 60 percent of U.S.
electricity consumption, the trend has real policy significance for the goal of
accelerating clean energy in the near term.8 This trend, as some states now realize,
also presents a unique economic opportunity. States that can ease regulatory
pathways and connect companies with renewable energy stand to benefit as
companies increasingly seek to locate facilities close to where the clean electricity
they use is generated.
This Article explores the barriers and opportunities for states, companies, and
emissions reduction goals that form the impetus for regulatory reforms responsive
to corporate demand for clean power. Part I begins by situating the large electricity
consumer within electric utility regulation. The commercial and industrial customer
has long occupied a tailored space in electricity ratemaking and continues to
represent a unique block of influence in newer realms, such as demand-side
management and energy efficiency policy. Part I provides the historical and
regulatory context that informs the modern developments this Article explores. With
this grounding, it then details the corporate demand for clean power that is driving
state-level reform today—companies’ pledges, motivations, and solutions—and
what has made accessing renewables difficult in much of the country, where
traditional utility regulatory structures still dominate. Part I also assesses the trend
in relation to the increased emphasis on diverse subfederal and nongovernmental
forces following the U.S. repudiation of the Paris Climate Accord.
Part II provides a primer on corporate renewable energy purchasing as it has
developed to date and the leading policy innovations shaping reform debates across
the states. An expanding suite of policy instruments can improve the regulatory
environment for corporate consumers of electricity, from new green rate designs
(also called tariffs in the industry) and power purchase agreements for large
renewable projects, to measures that invigorate business development of distributed
energy resources. With a focus on traditionally regulated states, it addresses state
regulatory variability and factors that may affect a state’s amenability to policy
innovations in this sphere.
Part III then evaluates the role of corporate demand for clean power in the
broader context of the modern energy transition. Perhaps most notably today, this
transition is characterized by the continued shift to lower carbon energy resources
and a widely conflicted state and federal policy environment. High-stakes debate
over what a modern energy sector should be has launched an in-depth reassessment
7

AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 4.
See generally Electricity Explained: Use of Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity_use [https://perma.cc/T9
PA-6H9K] (last updated Apr. 30, 2018) (noting that the percentage of electricity sales to
commercial classes was 36.6 percent and to industrial classes was 25.7 percent).
8

664

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

of the traditional utility business model, electric grid operation and design, and what
energy services will be valued most by consumers in the future. As one among many
moving parts in this transition, meeting corporate demand for clean power represents
part of a broader shift toward increasingly active consumers on the grid. With that
frame, Part III considers potential implications of the trend for further dispersal of
decision-making in energy policy, of nonutility influence in integrated resource
planning for electric power at the state level, and of equity within and across
electricity customer classes. The Article concludes that the potential value and risks
of this trend for the low-carbon shift hinge on whether states meaningfully pair the
goal of emissions reduction with economic development in the design of legal
instruments for reform. Finally, while appreciating the value of corporate demand,
the Article cautions against overly celebrating the 100-percent-renewable claims
companies make in light of their ongoing reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear energy.
I. CORPORATE DEMAND FOR CLEAN POWER
Corporate demand for renewable energy has been growing for several years,
but this demand came into clearer focus against a backdrop of the Trump
Administration’s concerted efforts to revive the flagging coal industry.9 This Part
situates the trend in relation to shifting U.S. energy policy. To understand the
significance of corporate demand in electricity regulation, it is important to look
beyond the immediate trend making headlines today to understand the historical role
of commercial and industrial consumers on the grid. By highlighting the unique
position of large electricity customers in several exemplary areas critical to the
modern energy transition, this Part provides that needed context before turning
attention to current demand for clean power among these large consumers: What is
motivating companies to seek renewable energy sources? What is the scale of
demand? How have these companies responded to the shifting political environment
affecting the energy sector? How have companies worked with and around existing
regulatory structures to achieve their clean energy goals?
A. The Corporate Electricity Consumer
Commercial and industrial consumers have long occupied a unique position on
the grid. Commonly referred to in the industry as “C&I,” these corporate consumers
interact with utilities, project developers, and wholesale markets in ways that stand
out as markedly different from residential electricity customers.

9
See, e.g., President Donald Trump, Remarks at the Unleashing American Energy
Event, (June 29, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-unleashing-american-energy-event/ [https://perma.cc/G9JC-GSHY] (“We
have finally ended the war on coal.”); Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (2017)
(discussing lifting the coal leasing moratorium on federal land).
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Although residential customers are the most numerous, they only account for
37 percent of electricity demand.10 Commercial and industrial users account for 63
percent of electricity consumption (36 percent and 27 percent respectively).11 The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) considers commercial use to be
broadly inclusive of “office buildings, hotels and motels, restaurants, street lighting,
retail stores and wholesale businesses and medical, religious, educational, and social
facilities.”12 In contrast, the industrial sector includes such uses as “manufacturing,
construction, mining, agriculture and forestry operations.”13
Because of this profile, companies are important consumers from a range of
perspectives. From the perspective of utilities, having one large commercial or
industrial customer may be equivalent to serving many residential customers—thus,
based on the significance of their load, commercial and industrial customers have
leverage in securing advantageous programs. States and local governments may
have an economic interest in attracting or retaining a commercial or industrial
enterprise. In addition, changes to the way commercial and industrial customers use
electricity can have an outsized effect on environmental impacts of the electric
power sector. Industrial customers are responsible for significant greenhouse gas
emissions, which, although not all the result of electricity consumption, may be
reduced if there are clear regulatory pathways to renewable energy access.14
Three areas highlight the unique position of commercial and industrial
customers in the electricity sector, each of which is addressed here briefly in turn:
(1) ratemaking, (2) demand response, and (3) energy efficiency.
1. Ratemaking
The unique electric power needs of commercial and industrial enterprises are
routinely accounted for in the ratemaking context. Commercial and industrial
customers have long been charged specialized rates for electricity they consume,
because of the scale and consistency of their demand, among other factors.
Electricity rates are the mechanism by which utilities recover the cost of
providing electric power to consumers and earn revenue for shareholders. State
public utility commissions set retail electricity rates—that is, the price customers
pay their utility per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity they use. Rate design typically
groups customers into classes based on their demand requirements and other
10

DIV. OF ENERGY MKT. OVERSIGHT, OFFICE OF ENF’T, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 43 (2015),
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU7WDQ2T] [hereinafter FERC, ENERGY PRIMER].
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS, 2017, at 7 fig.4 (2018), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/pdf
/2017_co2analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW5W-BWDC] (discussing energy-related carbon
dioxide by end-use sectors from 1990–2017).
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common characteristics. The common classes are residential, commercial, and
industrial.15 Utilities may apply different rates to different classes—indeed, rates set
for different classes need not be equally profitable for the utility, so long as service
is provided under the same basic conditions, the rates for each class are just and
reasonable, and the rates for one class do not amount to discrimination against
another class.16
Compared to the average American home, which consumed an average of 867
kWh/month in 2017, 17 commercial customers averaged just under 6,200
kWh/month, although large businesses consume much more than this—a large retail
building, for instance, may use ten times that amount. 18 Average monthly
consumption among industrial customers exceeds both classes at over 97,000
kWh/month.19 With commercial and industrial classes representing the majority of
the total U.S. electric load, users within these classes represent substantially more
consumption per account than residential customers.20 The ratio of customer class to
15

See G. PHILIP NOWAK & SHARON L. TAYLOR, 1 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS §
2.08 RATE DESIGN (2018) (describing the common methods used to allocate demand costs
among different customer classes).
16
See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2018) (“No public utility shall, with respect to any
transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any
undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice
or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service,
facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of
service.”). Courts have explained the same principles as they apply at the state level. See
Phila. Suburban Transp. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 281 A.2d 179, 184–85 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1971) (explaining, with reference to state-regulated retail rates, “[t]he requirement is
merely that rates for one class of service shall not be unreasonably prejudicial and
disadvantageous to a patron in any other class of service. Before a rate can be declared
unduly preferential and therefore unlawful . . . [t]here must be an advantage to one at the
expense of the other.” (emphasis added) (quoting Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 84 Pa. Super. 255, 272 (1925))). See generally NOWAK & TAYLOR, supra note 15
(discussing rate design and customer classes).
17
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does an American Home Use?,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97
&t=3 [https://perma.cc/4UEH-R6JH].
18
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2017 AVERAGE MONTHLY BILL – COMMERCIAL (2017)
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table5_b.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3
NW-B8RS]; see also Mark MacCracken, What Retailers Need to Know About Their Energy
Bill — and How to Lower It, CHAIN STORE AGE (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.chainstoreage.com/store-spaces/what-retailers-need-know-about-their-energybill-and-how-lower-it/ [https://perma.cc/P8FL-7VVC].
19
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2017 AVERAGE MONTHLY BILL – INDUSTRIAL (2017),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table5_c.pdf [https://perma.cc/28
7B-KMV4].
20
Electricity Data Browser: Number of Customer Accounts: All Sectors Nov. 2017,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/56?agg=
0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&freq=M&start=200101&end=201711&ctype=map&ltype=pin&rt
ype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0 [https://perma.cc/UY9N-RGC4] (noting that there are
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consumption depends on the scale of commercial and industrial activity in a service
area. In some areas, this ratio can be stark—for the New England provider
Eversource Energy, for example, 2 percent of customers purportedly account for 80
percent of demand.21
Although rates vary over time, industrial customers in the U.S. historically pay
the lowest price per kWh, residential customers pay the highest, and commercial
customers typically pay a price in between. Based on the data available as of this
writing, the Energy Information Administration reported average retail electricity
prices in November 2017. They were 6.79 cents/kWh for industrial customers,
compared with 10.55 cents/kWh for commercial, and 13.01 cents/kWh for
residential customers.22 Industrial customers’ lower rates reflect the fact that their
load demand is higher and more consistent, and they can receive electricity at higher
voltage levels than other end users.23 With the most predictable, large-volume load,
commercial and industrial customers may be approved for so-called interruptible
rates, which provide a discount to the consumer in exchange for an agreement to
reduce electricity use at the utility’s request during peak demand. 24 This is one
approach to “demand response,” discussed below.
Rates also vary from state to state. For example, electricity consumption by the
average home in Louisiana is more than twice that of the average home in Hawaii.25
This disparity is understandable when comparing the difference in residential retail
prices state by state—prices in Hawaii are roughly three times higher than prices in
Louisiana.26 While prices vary by state for commercial and industrial class rates as
they do for residential customers,27 utilities will continue to regard commercial and
roughly 133 million residential accounts compared to approximately 18.4 million
commercial and 830,000 industrial accounts).
21
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., FACT SHEET: INDUSTRIAL
EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS CAN ACHIEVE LARGE ENERGY SAVINGS AT LOW COST (2016)
http://aceee.org/fact-sheet/low-cost-ieep
[https://perma.cc/W6ZV-HB67]
[hereinafter
ACEEE, FACT SHEET: INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS].
22
Electricity Monthly Update with Data for November 2017, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/end_use.php#tabs_
sales-3 [https://perma.cc/E3J2-6NQR].
23
FERC, ENERGY PRIMER, supra note 10, at 43.
24
7 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTION SCOPE: UNIT IV 199 (2017) (indicating such rates
apply to interruptible load, which represents large-volume “consumer load that, in
accordance with contractual arrangements, can be interrupted at the time of annual peak load
by the action of the consumer at the direct request of the system operator”).
25
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does an American Home Use?,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3
[https://perma.cc/4UEH-R6JH].
26
Rankings: Average Retail Price of Electricity to Residential Sector, November 2018
(cents/kWh), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/rankings/#/series/31
[https://perma.cc/DL78-UPUL] (showing that Hawaii pays 32.46 cents/kWh compared to
Louisiana at 9.11 cents/kWh).
27
Average Retail Price of Electricity: All Sectors Nov. 2017, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://bit.ly/2VmDc2o [https://perma.cc/647H-PYCH].

668

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

industrial consumers as important, as those classes are projected to increase energy
consumption, including electricity, between now and 2040. 28 During this period,
residential consumption is projected to flatten, with industrial and commercial
consumption increasing at 0.7 percent and 0.5 percent annual growth rate,
respectively.29
2. Demand Response
Commercial and industrial consumers have played a central role in the
development of one of the most important trends in the modern energy transition—
so-called “demand response” strategies for reducing electricity consumption.30 The
concept of demand response is fairly straight forward—through communication,
payment, or other incentives, electricity customers can reduce electricity use on
demand at times that yield strategic economic, operational, or reliability benefits to
the grid. 31 Typically, as the Supreme Court described in 2016’s major demand
response ruling, FERC v. EPSA, this is accomplished when wholesale market
operators (or utilities, as the case may be) “pay electricity consumers for
commitments not to use power at certain times.” 32 In this way, Justice Kagan
explained, “wholesale market operators can sometimes—say, on a muggy August
day—offer electricity both more cheaply and more reliably by paying users to dial
down their consumption than by paying power plants to ramp up their production.”33
In this way, it is possible, depending on the scale of demand response achieved, to
match supply and demand more accurately and economically, mitigate the impact of
intermittent renewable energy production, and even reduce the need for new power
plants to meet peak demand.34
Commercial and industrial customers have been the focus of most demand
response efforts since the concept’s earliest implementation, and this remains true
today.35 The reasons for this stem from the basic profile of these customer classes—
28

U.S. Energy Demand Slows Except for Industrial, Commercial Sectors, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=21012
[https://perma.cc/6XF8-AJV8].
29
Id.
30
For an explanatory account of demand response and its evolution from ad hoc utilitycustomer bargaining to a key fixture in the modern electricity sector, see generally Joel B.
Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market Pathways and Challenges in the
Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351 (2017).
31
FERC explains demand response more precisely as “the reduction in consumption of
electricity by customers from their expected consumption in response to either reliability or
price triggers where the customer foregoes power use for short periods, shifts some high
energy use activities to other times, or uses onsite generation.” FERC, ENERGY PRIMER,
supra note 10, at 44.
32
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016) (confirming FERC’s
authority to regulate wholesale demand response transactions).
33
Id. at 767.
34
For more on benefits, see Eisen, supra note 30, at 367–68.
35
Id. at 365 n.36.
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significant electric load, compared to residential use, from a smaller group of
consumers, making individualized or customer-class communications more feasible
but also more meaningful in terms of curtailed demand. Newer aggregation
approaches can assemble a demand “block” for reduction across a swath of smaller
load points. As FERC v. EPSA describes, wholesale aggregation typically involves
“aggregators of multiple users of electricity, as well as large-scale individual users
like factories or big-box stores, submit bids to decrease electricity consumption by
a set amount at a set time for a set price.” 36 Large commercial and industrial
customers are critical to these programs because their electricity consumption offers
the greatest potential for grid balancing and strategic management of peak demand.37
Reducing peak demand makes it possible to avoid using more expensive generation
facilities and ease the strain of high demand on transmission and distribution lines.38
3. Energy Efficiency
Large electricity consumers benefit economically from energy efficiency
measures and also offer outsized benefits to state energy efficiency programs. Over
half the states have enacted Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERSs), which
set long-term energy saving targets that utilities must meet, typically through
customer energy efficiency programs, including for commercial and industrial
consumers. 39 Essentially, EERSs require a reduction in electricity sales through
increased energy efficiency.
Energy efficiency allows activities that depend on electricity to be conducted
as usual but with lower energy consumption. Although energy efficiency is a
“demand side” resource, in contrast to demand response—which may shift, rather
than reduce consumption, and can be used strategically in response to real-time
conditions—energy efficiency reduces demand for electricity overall. EERSs are
36

See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,136 S. Ct at 770.
See Demand Response Saves Electricity During Times of High Demand, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
24872 [https://perma.cc/FKL6-6HDC] (showing sectoral composition of demand response
programs, 2014). Industrial consumers afforded 54 percent of actual peak savings, compared
with 21 percent from commercial and 25 percent from residential consumers. Id. See also
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCE
METERING 17 (2017), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/DR-AM-Report2017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/747C-XHRU] (describing the contributions of each customer class to
peak and overall energy savings through demand response).
38
Demand response saves electricity during times of high demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN (2016) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24872 [https://perma.cc/
FKL6-6HDC].
39
The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) tracks state
EERS and annual electric savings targets. For state-by-state information, see AM. COUNCIL
FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS
(2017), https://aceee.org/sites/default/files/state-eers-0117.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS763LDY].
37
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typically funded by ratepayers to approximate what the utility would otherwise have
received through the lost electricity sales.40
Here again, commercial and industrial consumers are in a position of
importance because of the scale of their electricity consumption. According to the
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, “[f]or virtually any utility
system, large-customer energy efficiency is the cheapest energy resource
available.”41 Averaging across state efficiency programs, commercial and industrial
customers account for 55 percent of energy savings. 42 The industrial sector in
particular represents a more significant savings potential per program dollar than
other customer classes.43 Although industrial consumers have resisted being subject
to EERSs-related fees under one-size-fits-all programs, which may seem to
duplicate efficiency investments they make independently, some states have met this
objection by allowing large customers to “self-direct” funds for energy efficiency in
ways that work for the individual firm.44
Looking to the future, the role of large electricity consumers will likely become
more pronounced as states improve and expand energy efficiency programs. A
recent study by the Electric Power Research Institute estimates over 740,000 GWh
of energy efficiency economic potential from 2016 to 2035 nationwide across all
three classes. 45 For states, this means cost-effective savings are possible ranging
from 12 percent (Missouri) to 21 percent (Florida) in 2035, and over twenty-six
states with savings potential over 15 percent on this time horizon.46 Whether these
savings can be realized will depend on state programs effectively meeting the needs
of commercial and industrial consumers.
Taken together, these examples show that, with their unique position on the
grid, corporate customers have had a significant role in the development of energy
policy for some time.
40
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEE ACTION GUIDE FOR STATES: ENERGY EFFICIENCY
AS A LEAST-COST STRATEGY TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND AIR POLLUTION AND
MEET ENERGY NEEDS IN THE POWER SECTOR 30–38 (2016), https://www4.eere.energy.gov/

seeaction/system/files/documents/pathways-guide-states-final0415.pdf [https://perma.cc/M
DZ2-5UX6].
41
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., FACT SHEET: MYTHS AND FACTS
ABOUT INDUSTRIAL OPT-OUT PROVISIONS (2016) [hereinafter ACEEE, FACT SHEET:
MYTHS], http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/ieep-myths-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUS7TSMT].
42
Id.
43
ACEEE, FACT SHEET: INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 21.
44
ACEEE, FACT SHEET: MYTHS, supra note 41; see also ACEEE, FACT SHEET:
INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 21 (detailing features of the most successful
industrial energy efficiency programs).
45
ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., STATE LEVEL ELECTRIC ENERGY EFFICIENCY
POTENTIAL ESTIMATES xi (2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/05/f34/epri_state_
level_electric_energy_efficiency_potential_estimates_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6LZ7ADU].
46
Id. (noting that estimates for 2035 are relative to adjusted baseline sales and reflect
regional similarities due to “sector composition and climate zone”).
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B. Clean Energy Pledges and Corporate Demand
Commercial and industrial consumers have expanded their influence in the
electricity sector beyond the demand side of the meter with increasing interest in
access to electricity generated with renewable energy. Google’s announcement in
2017 that it reached its 100 percent goal was significant, representing 2.6 GW of
renewable energy development, and it drew attention to persistent regulatory
barriers impeding access to renewable projects.
Many other companies in recent years have made similar pledges. Apple made
an announcement of its own in April 2018, issuing a press release with the headline
“Apple now globally powered by 100 percent renewable energy” and the subheading
“Nine more Apple suppliers commit to 100 percent clean energy production.” 47
Companies including Walmart, Facebook, Bank of America, Coca-Cola, Citi, Wells
Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, and IKEA have all declared goals for 100 percent
renewable energy by 2020; eBay, Nike, and Anheuser-Busch/Budweiser, by 2025.48
As of mid-2018, these were among the 137 multinational companies that have
pledges to achieve 100 percent renewable energy as part of RE100, an initiative
launched in 2014 in the U.S., now expanded to Europe, India, and China.49
Companies want to power their operations with renewable energy for a variety
of reasons. In some instances, it may be a reflection of the culture and values of
company employees, an image corporate leadership wants to project, shifting
economics for renewables, shareholder pressure to address the corporate carbon
footprint, or a combination of drivers.50 During President Obama’s second term,

47

Apple Now Globally Powered by 100 Percent Renewable Energy, APPLE (Apr. 9,
2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/04/apple-now-globally-powered-by-100percent-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/469S-6DS5] [hereinafter Apple Renewables].
48
See Rob Price, Facebook Says It Will Be Powered by 100% Renewable Energy by
2020, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2018) https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-sets-2020renewable-energy-and-greenhouse-gas-targets-2018-8?r=UK&IR=T [https://perma.cc/F3
KQ-NNBB]; David Ferris, Budweiser Parent Sets Crazy-Ambitious Renewables Goal,
ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052308 [https://perma.
cc/RZ8G-427E]; World’s Largest Brewer to Buy Wind Farm’s Electricity, GREENWIRE
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060060685 [https://perma.cc/6FK7RYVB]. See generally Companies, RE100, http://re100.org [https://perma.cc/2ASWWDVL] (listing companies committing to 100 percent renewable).
49
See generally RE100, supra note 48. The trend is bigger than just corporate
consumers, as many local governments and large institutions like universities are also setting
100 percent renewable energy goals. Their circumstances and obligations present unique
issues sufficiently different from companies to make their ambitions outside the scope of this
Article, but it is important to note the breadth of trend of large consumers to pursue renewable
energy goals. See generally Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENVTL. L. 105
(2016) (addressing some of the unique issues facing cities with renewable energy ambitions).
50
A survey of member companies of the coalition RE100 report on their motivations
and rank “management of greenhouse gases” and “corporate social responsibility” as the top
motivators, followed third by “economics of renewable energy.” See THE CLIMATE GRP.,
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many of the companies now pursuing renewable energy publicly aligned with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and progressive states to support the Clean
Power Plan. The Clean Power Plan is the high-profile Clean Air Act rule EPA
finalized in 2015 that set carbon pollution standards for existing power plants for the
first time. 51 In a letter to the National Governors Association, for example,
companies including Staples, Nestle, L’Oreal USA, Levi Strauss & Co., Mars,
General Mills, Gap, adidas, eBay, Eileen Fisher, The North Face, Unilever, Seventh
Generation, Timberland, and Stonyfield opened with the statement, “We, the
undersigned companies and investors, have a significant presence in your state and
strongly support the implementation of the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Carbon Pollution Standards for existing power plants.”52 They emphasized the need
for “long-term policies that provide businesses the certainty needed to transition to
a clean energy economy.”53
When the Clean Power Plan was challenged in court, Amazon, Apple, Google,
and Microsoft filed an amicus brief to support EPA, touting their “collective market
capitalization of over $1.7 trillion and hundreds of thousands of employees located
in every region of the country.”54 The companies argued, “the Clean Power Plan will
provide considerable benefits to electricity purchasers and . . . will not only be good
for the environment, it will be good for business.”55 An amicus brief filed by Mars,
IKEA, Adobe, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts emphasized how
they “use a significant amount of electricity to power their business operations,
manufacturing facilities, warehouses, data centers, and other infrastructure in the
United States.”56 The brief stressed to the Court of Appeals that a “majority of the
RE100, APPROACHING A TIPPING POINT: HOW CORPORATE USERS ARE REDEFINING GLOBAL
ELECTRICITY MARKETS 18 (2018) https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/re100
_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK8P-2P3S] (“[M]embers . . . are increasingly talking
about their RE100 commitments in terms of business opportunity, risk mitigation and
investment returns.”). Other institutions and scholars also discuss the role of shareholder
influence on corporate governance pertaining to environmental and social risks. See, e.g.,
Copland & O’Keefe, supra note 6. See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism:
The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (urging
greater attention to environmental, social, and governance risks within corporate structures
and regulatory support for risk related activism, which she argues can promote corporate
accountability).
51
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015).
52
See Letter from CERES to Nat’l Governors Ass’n (July 31, 2015),
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/Letters/BICEP/CPP%20Governor%20Letter%20%20National%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/8DXH-LHWQ].
53
Id.
54
Brief for Amazon.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, West
Virginia v. EPA (2016) (No. 15-1363), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2016.
04.01_major_tech_companies_amicus_brief_for_epa.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLT7-K5VK].
55
Id.
56
Brief for Mars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–4, West Virginia
v. EPA (2016) (No. 15-1363), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2016.04.01_
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largest U.S. businesses,” including their own, “have established public sustainability
and energy goals to increase their use of zero-emitting renewable energy and billions
of kilowatt hours are still needed to meet these renewable energy goals.”57 They note
that a “poor reputation on climate . . . can hurt sales and damage customer
relations.” 58 In filing these briefs, the companies joined eighteen states, sixty
municipalities from twenty-eight states representing a population of 33 million, ten
power companies accounting for 10 percent of U.S. electricity-generating capacity,
and many business and health associations in support of EPA’s rule.59
With the Clean Power Plan now stayed in the courts as the new EPA
Administrator works to repeal the rule, states, cities, and companies that supported
the rule have had to regroup.60 This shift in federal policy was compounded by the
Trump Administration’s formal abrogation of the international climate accord
known as the Paris Agreement which had entered into force in the U.S. in November
2016.61 Under the Agreement, the world’s nations committed to restrain the global
rise in temperatures to two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels or better, using
domestic policy measures to be developed by each nation for its own
circumstances.62 The Clean Power Plan is a regulatory strategy developed by the
Obama Administration which was seen as central to the United States’ pledged

adobe_mars_ikea_bcbs_ma_amicus_brief_for_epa.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AAT-4F8P].
57
Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted).
58
Id. at 9.
59
Aligned with West Virginia in challenging the rule were 28 states, power companies,
trade associations representing companies heavily invested in fossil fuels. See ENVTL. DEF.
FUND, LIST OF SUPPORTERS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN IN COURT
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/list_of_supporters_of_the_clean_power_pla
n_in_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF66-TD5X].
60
See, e.g., Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S.Ct. 1000 (2016)
(mem.) (No. 15A773), http://www.ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/15A773%
20West%20Virginia%20v.%20EPA%20-%20USSC%20stay%20order%20(M0118593xC
ECC6).pdf [https://perma.cc/S3VW-B8VD].
61
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, STATUS OF PARIS AGREEMENT,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII7-d.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X27S-RRMG] (including Entry into Force and participant
signatures and ratification dates).
62
The Paris Agreement is an agreement implementing protocol for the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a near-universal treaty with
195 Parties, including the United States. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php [https://perma.cc/D2XV-QEYX] (listing
the latest information concerning dates of signature and receipt of instruments of ratification
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations). Parties to the UNFCCC agreed to “adopt
national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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contribution to climate mitigation under the Paris Agreement.63 As they did with the
Clean Power Plan, many companies supported the Paris Agreement by publicly
calling on the U.S. and other nations to chart a “clear, long-term” climate change
solution.64
This context of federal policy reversal creates an environment in which
companies’ counterposing renewable energy goals stand out. Many of the
companies that supported the Clean Power Plan and the Paris Agreement are now
trying to send the message “We Are Still In” with the rest of the world. The “We
Are Still In” Coalition represents a noteworthy, mixed coalition that includes states,
local governments, investors, and companies that have pledged to operate on
renewable energy.65
Beyond environmental- and public-image reasons to pursue clean energy,
however, is a clear and overarching motivation to save money on electricity and
mitigate risks.66 For some, undoubtedly, this is the motivation, with an improved
public image a nice secondary benefit. The cost of wind and solar power has dropped
significantly in recent years, and long-term renewable energy contracts can stabilize
cost predictability into the future.67 Google explains its 100 percent renewable goal
63

See U.S. Cover Note INDC and Supporting Documents, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Pub
lished%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20
INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CLF4-L5BM]
(identifying carbon pollution standards for existing power plans as among the domestic
measures the US intended to implement for emissions reduction).
64
See, e.g., Investors Call Upon Governments to Secure a Clear, Long-Term Goal at
COP21, WE MEAN BUS. (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/blog/
investors-call-upon-governments-secure-clear-long-term-goal-cop21 [https://perma.cc/7H
PQ-HTK9].
65
See US Action on Climate Change Is Irreversible, WE ARE STILL IN,
https://www.wearestillin.com/us-action-climate-change-irreversible [https://perma.cc/X42
M-BR9T]. We Are Still In “is an effort coordinated by The American Sustainable Business
Council, B Team, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Center for American Progress, Ceres, CDP,
Climate Mayors, Climate Nexus, C40, C2ES, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental
Entrepreneurs, Georgetown Climate Center, ICLEI, National League of Cities, Rocky
Mountain Institute, Second Nature, Sierra Club, The Climate Group, We Mean Business,
and
World
Wildlife
Fund
(WWF).”
About,
WE
ARE
STILL
IN ,
https://www.wearestillin.com/about [https://perma.cc/7WY3-SHBM].
66
See, e.g., THE CLIMATE GRP., supra note 50, at 11; LORI A. BIRD ET AL., NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABS., RENEWABLE ENERGY PRICE-STABILITY BENEFITS IN UTILITY
GREEN POWER PROGRAMS: TECHNICAL REPORT 4–5 (2008). The report explains the benefit
of fixed price renewables and notes that purchasing green power for commercial customers
“is a business decision” motivated “by an interest in ‘doing the right thing,’ generating
customer, shareholder, or employee goodwill, meeting corporate or organizational goals for
sustainable business practices, or for financial reasons, such as mitigating potential penalties
for greenhouse gas emissions in the future or providing a hedge against fuel price volatility.”
Id.
67
See, e.g., Wind generator’s cost declines reflect technology improvements and siting
decisions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN (July 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
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by citing both a desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as “part of the solution
to solving global climate change” and an interest in the insulation from “fuel-price
volatility” renewable energy can provide, given that wind and solar fuel inputs are
“essentially free.”68 The global manager of renewable energy for GM, which has
pledged to operate all its facilities with clean power by 2050, characterized the goal
as “primarily all driven off economics,” based on “[w]ind and solar costs . . . coming
down so fast.”69 As it pursues two new Texas wind-farm deals, GM reports it is
already realizing worldwide savings of $5 million per year.70
Projects like these present significant economic opportunities for states that are
able to ease regulatory pathways and connect companies with renewable energy.
This is especially true as companies increasingly favor power sources near their
facilities.71 As the next Part will discuss, state policymakers are beginning to see that
access to renewable resources offers a way to attract new companies to their state,
driving economic development beyond the renewable energy project itself.
Yet even as access to renewable energy has become increasingly desirable for
many companies operating in the U.S., the law in many states stands in the way.
Although big-name companies have been able to bargain for renewable energy, large
electricity consumers commonly find that, under state law, they have no legal
pathway to obtain electricity directly from renewable energy producers, nor
mechanisms for buying renewable energy through their utility. As the next Part
explains, these barriers result in an unmet demand for clean power, now a growing
influence in state energy policy.
II. SHIFTING STATE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS
Recent reforms at the state level in response to corporate demand build on an
existing regulatory landscape that has been evolving for over more than a decade.
Reforms affecting corporate access to renewable energy are primarily an issue for
state law due to the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional division of federal and state
authority over energy transactions.72 The Act empowers FERC to regulate wholesale
electricity sales and interstate transmission while preserving state authority over
retail electricity sales to consumers.73 Likewise, electricity generated by consumers
on their own property—known as distributed generation, most typically in the form
of solar panels but also small-scale wind—is primarily regulated at the state level.74
detail.php?id=36615 [https://perma.cc/6C36-9FKS].
68
GOOGLE, supra note 1, at 3–4.
69
Nichola Groom, Big Corporations Drive Wind, Solar Growth, GREENWIRE (June 21,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060056346/search?keyword=big+corp
orations+drive+wind%2C+solar+growth [https://perma.cc/95WG-XCRL].
70
Id.
71
GOOGLE, supra note 1, at 6.
72
16 U.S.C. § 824 (2015).
73
Id.
74
See Final Rule, Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures (Order No. 2003), 104 FERC 61,103 (2003) (stating that FERC does not assert
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As the last Part made clear, companies buying renewable energy, in and of
itself, is not new—indeed, despite the barriers that exist, business renewables have
already been an important driver for renewable energy growth in some states. New
attention on the barriers is warranted considering the scale of development that
would be needed to meet the RE100 goals. To assess recent state-level developments
in this area, this Part first provides a basic primer on corporate renewable energy
purchasing as it has developed to date. As this discussion will underscore, the
distinction between states that adhere to traditional regulation of electric utilities and
states that have restructured electric utility regulation has been important to
corporate access to renewable energy, although there are other relevant factors. It
then turns to leading policy innovations currently shaping reform debates across
more traditionally regulated states.
A. Overview of State Policy and Corporate Consumer Access to Renewables
Companies wanting to operate on clean power have three basic options:
generate electricity from renewable energy, buy electricity generated from
renewable energy, or buy and retire renewable energy certificates (RECs) equivalent
to their electricity consumption.
To generate electricity from renewable energy, large companies may be able to
build and own a large-scale facility. Apple prefers direct ownership, stating a policy
to build its own renewable energy projects “[w]here feasible . . . including solar
arrays, wind farms, biogas fuel cells, and low-impact hydro generation systems.”75
Indeed, Apple has gone beyond simply generating electricity for on-site use to
establishing a subsidiary for large-scale electricity generation, moving, as Professor
Gina Warren has described, from “purchaser to seller.” 76 In 2016, an Apple
subsidiary, Apple Energy LLC, received approval from FERC to sell wholesale
electricity at market-based rates. 77 Google has sought similar approval. 78 This
introduction of new actors into the wholesale market presents a range of issues

federal jurisdiction “when a retail customer installs a generator that will produce electric
energy to be consumed on site”); MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC 61,340 (2001) (order
denying request for declaratory order) (stating that FERC does not assert jurisdiction over
power flows under state net metering programs, which regulate state billing practices for
certain retail customers).
75
APPLE, ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2018), https://www.apple.com/
environment/pdf/Apple_Environmental_Responsibility_Report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9N9E-QYWX].
76
Gina S. Warren, 1-Click Energy: Managing Corporate Demand for Clean Power, 78
MD. L. REV. 73, 82 (2018).
77
Id. at 83.
78
Id. at 85 (citing Application of Google Energy LLC Market Based Rate Authority
and Granting of Waivers and Blanket Authorization, 130 FERC 61,107 (2009)).
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beyond this Article, underscoring how a new set of companies—not traditional
industry actors—are shifting the landscape across multiple regulatory contexts.79
Most typically, however, a company that generates its own electricity will do
so with solar panels on building rooftops or smaller ground arrays. Using this option,
for example, Walmart reports it has 364 installations and plans to reach 500 by 2020;
IKEA boasts 750,000 panels on its store rooftops around the world. 80 How
economical this option is for companies, especially smaller firms, varies by state. In
many states, net energy metering policies designed to promote distributed generation
allow consumers to benefit from dollar-for-dollar reductions on their electricity bill
for excess electricity they generate that goes back on the grid.81 These policies work
well for residential and smaller commercial consumers but commonly limit the
degree to which large commercial and industrial consumers can benefit by capping
how much electricity can be net-metered.82 This does not prevent larger consumers
from installing solar panels, but where caps apply, it limits the incentive to smaller
customers. Moreover, some states have begun dismantling net metering programs at
the behest of utilities worried the rapid growth of rooftop solar is a threat to
revenue. 83 A second limitation of this option for large consumers is that the
electricity generated by rooftop systems covers some but often far from all their
electricity demand.84 Thus, a company that saves money and curbs emissions by
generating its own renewable energy often must also utilize one of the other

79

Warren, supra note 76 (engaging with the issues raised by the Apple Energy with a
focus on legal reforms possible through FERC, with a focus on the market-power rule).
80
WALMART, 2018 GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 218 (2018); IKEA, INGKA
HOLDING B.V., SUSTAINABILITY SUMMARY REPORT FY17, at 5, 17 (2017).
81
See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY & U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, NET METERING (2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/DSIRE_Net_Metering_November2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H
6D-GXRJ].
82
See AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 11.
83
Net energy metering policies have recently become controversial in a number of
states, creating economic uncertainty for a consumer considering rooftop systems, and
undercutting the investment of consumers already generating on-site solar power. For more
on the legal and policy context for these controversies, see generally Lincoln L. Davies &
Sanya Carley, Emerging Shadows in National Solar Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering
Transition in Context, 30 ELECTRICITY J. 33 (2017) (drawing lessons from other states from
Nevada’s tumultuous net metering debate) and Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing
the Future of the Electricity Grid, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43 (2017) (situating net metering
in broader contexts and proposing an alternative pricing mechanism that incorporates social
benefits of solar energy). To track recent state legislative activity related to solar energy, see
NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., 50 STATES OF SOLAR, Q4 2016 QUARTERLY REPORT AND
ANNUAL REVIEW (2017).
84
For example, IKEA’s Kaarst store in Germany, labelled as the company’s “leading
sustainable store,” generates 339 MWh of electricity with onsite solar photovoltaic panels,
accounting for eight percent of the store’s annual electricity demand. IKEA, supra note 80,
at 20.
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options—either buy the remaining power it needs from renewable sources it does
not generate or buy RECs to match whatever use exceeds the output of its systems.
Buying RECs has long been a way for consumers to “offset” the emissions
resulting from the electricity they use.85 In most areas of the country, consumers
receive electricity through the grid, which is powered by many power plants
generating electricity from coal, natural gas, nuclear power, or renewables. Thus the
electricity they use is from this mix of fuels. 86 The concept is that each unit of
electricity (i.e., megawatt-hour) generated from renewable energy is represented by
a REC.87 A consumer may purchase renewable energy bundled with its associated
RECs or unbundled RECs, which represent units of electricity verified to have been
generated from renewable resources but which may have no geographic or temporal
connection to the buyer’s actual usage.88
Although many companies continue to rely on unbundled RECs to pursue clean
energy goals, this option increasingly has lost favor. RECs are losing their appeal
mostly due to persistent concerns about their value as a measure of a company’s
energy profile. The legitimacy of unbundled RECs depends on rigorous verification
and tracking methodologies to ensure that electricity represented by a REC is not
counted by more than one entity, and companies have questioned the environmental
efficacy of matching consumption with REC purchases. Walmart, for example,
recently adopted a policy to avoid the purchase of unbundled RECs, explaining in
its public renewable energy strategic plan, “we do not have confidence that offsetting
instruments alone are sufficient to drive new renewable projects, as opposed to
simply shifting around ownership of existing renewable electrons.” 89 Google’s
current policy is “never to buy ‘unbundled’ or ‘naked’ RECs . . . sold on an open
market, independently of underlying physical energy.” 90 These are no longer
considered sufficient by companies concerned about climate change because they
do not necessarily drive new renewable energy development. As RECs continue to
fall out of favor, more companies are interested in access to electricity from
85

See generally Voluntary Green Procurement, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
https://www.nrel.gov/analysis/green-power.html?page=0
[https://perma.cc/3DGT-486T]
(tracking “status and trends in the voluntary green power market since its inception in the
1990s”).
86
For a basic introduction to the electric grid, see Electricity Explained: How
Electricity Is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity_delivery [https://perma.cc/DDN2-2JVF].
87
See generally Green Power Partnership: Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs),
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/renewable-energycertificates-recs [https://perma.cc/PK3E-8L7Z].
88
Id.
89
WALMART, WALMART’S APPROACH TO RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://cdn.corporate.
walmart.com/eb/80/4c32210b44ccbae634ddedd18a27/walmarts-approach-to-renewableenergy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BX2-KS2A]; see also AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at
7 (recognizing that unbundled RECs “do not generate savings or confer long-term price- or
fuel-hedging benefits” nor do they “necessarily support new or ‘additional’ project
development”).
90
GOOGLE, supra note 1, at 6.
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renewable energy projects, ideally local or regional to company facilities. This gives
a company more confidence that it is expanding renewable energy production, that
it will draw electricity from the area of the grid receiving the renewable output, and
that it can be recognized for using local or regional renewable resources to power its
operations.
Most companies pursuing this goal have focused renewable energy activities in
states that have restructured utility regulation to allow for retail competition—that
is, electricity consumers have a choice among electricity providers. Restructuring of
wholesale markets occurred as a result of FERC Orders during the late 1990s and
early 2000s, but state-level restructuring allowing for retail choice occurred across
several states as well.91 This trend halted after the California energy crisis of 2001,
which occurred during the state’s transition toward increased competition.92 States
that had not already restructured retained their traditional regulatory regimes, under
which utilities remain, for the most part, vertically integrated—controlling
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity with an exclusive right to
provide service within a geographical area approved by the state utility

91
See, e.g., Order No. 888 Final Rule, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 75 FERC
61,080 (1996) (mandating open access transmission and encouraging formation of regional
transmission organizations that today operate regional wholesale markets); Order No. 697
Final Rule, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and
Ancillary Services By Public Utilities, 119 FERC 61,295 (2007) (encouraging competition
in wholesale electric power markets); Order 890-A Order on Rehearing and Clarification,
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 121 FERC
61,297 (2007) (strengthening mandate for open and transparent transmission planning for
public utilities); Order 1000 Final Rule, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by
Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC 61,051 (2011) (mandating
regional coordination of transmission planning and establishing cost allocation principles for
shared transmission infrastructure). For more on restructuring of wholesale markets, see
generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999) (providing historical
context for the restructuring reforms of the 1990s). For information on state-level
restructuring, see LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 426–35 (2015)
(explaining retail choice and its policy implications).
92
See generally Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect
of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1 (2004)
(discussing what the Enron debacle can teach about energy markets); Jim Rossi, The Electric
Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between
Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768–70 (2002) (drawing
lessons from three historical texts on deregulation to explain how “the legal resolution of
jurisdictional boundaries plays a significant role in the development of sound deregulatory
policies”); Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy
Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002) (discussing what should be learned about energy
market restructuring from the Enron scandal and other aspects of California’s energy crisis
in 2000–01).
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commission.93 If a consumer is in Utility A’s territory, it can only buy retail electric
power from Utility A, whether it is a residential, commercial or industrial customer.
Thus, if Utility A is heavily invested in coal- and natural-gas-fired power plants,
consumers are essentially captive to that utility’s portfolio in traditionally regulated
states. For this reason, it has been easier for companies wanting to buy renewable
energy to do so in a restructured state where they can elect to buy from a range of
firms, some proffering electricity generated from renewable resources. Indeed,
according to the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA), “availability of retail
choice is a critical factor for a state’s attractiveness to corporate and other large
institutional buyers of [renewable energy].”94 Moreover, restructured states are often
perceived to have better electricity rates. A recent study of electricity prices found
that states with retail competition are “associated with lower . . . electricity prices”
for each customer class with the magnitude of the impact being greater for the large
customer classes.95
The legal mechanism for large-scale transactions is the power purchase
agreement (PPA) which, in its simplest form, is a long-term contract between a
renewable energy developer and corporate buyer for the generation and physical
delivery of electricity from the developer to the buyer.96 Because physical PPAs are
not available to companies in most traditionally regulated states, those companies
have looked for ways around regulatory barriers to access alternative energy sources

93

See AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 8 (depicting states that are restructured,
states with traditional regulation of vertically integrated utilities, and those of the second
group which have come up with a form of direct access for large consumers).
94
RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., CORPORATE CLEAN ENERGY PROCUREMENT
INDEX: STATE LEADERSHIP AND RANKINGS 25 (2017), http://www.informz.net/rilafonteva/data/images/RILAITICEIndex.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VZS-CH53]; see also AEEI,
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 7 (“The main barrier to accessing large offsite purchases is
the electricity market structure in the state where a company or facility is located, and in
particular whether utilities are vertically integrated or restructured.”).
95
Agustin J. Ros, An Econometric Assessment of Electricity Demand in the United
States Using Panel Data and the Impact of Retail Competition on Prices, 38 ENERGY J. 73,
73 (2015). But see NOAH DORMADY ET AL., WHO PAYS FOR RETAIL ELECTRIC
DEREGULATION?: EVIDENCE OF CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION FROM COMPLETE BILL DATA 33
(2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3174939 [https://perma.cc/VB
4X-UN3F] (concluding that savings at the retail level from restructuring “have generally
been more than offset by cross-subsidies to utility-affiliated [generation companies]”).
96
For detailed explanations of PPAs commonly employed by corporate consumers, see
AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY PPA GUIDEBOOK FOR
CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL PURCHASERS (2016), https://acore.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/Renewable-Energy-PPA-Guidebook-for-Corporate-and-Industrial-Customers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LK8L-948G]. Note that PPAs are not limited to use for renewable energy
deals. See, e.g., Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 155 FERC 61,101
(April 27, 2016) (order granting complaint and rescinding a waiver of affiliate restrictions as
to FirstEnergy’s PPA for electricity generated from coal, natural gas, and nuclear plants).
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not offered through their utilities. 97 Companies’ frustration with these barriers is
perhaps best illustrated by recent events in Nevada. Casino resorts in Nevada, a
traditionally regulated state, drew headlines when they applied to the state utility
commission for permission to withdraw as a retail customer from their utility,
Nevada Power, in order to purchase directly from renewable energy suppliers at
wholesale. 98 Not every state allows this, 99 and in Nevada, due to its regulatory
structure, even approved departing consumers must pay an exit fee—and in this case,
a multi-million-dollar fee.100
Some companies have successfully bypassed regulatory barriers in traditionally
regulated states, without leaving utility service, through elaborate legal
arrangements that are essentially “virtual,” or financial, PPAs. With this
arrangement, a corporate buyer pays for the electric power a renewable energy
project generates and the developer sells that electricity into the wholesale power
market rather than delivering it to the buyer. The buyer and developer share the risk
of the deal. RILA explains in simplified terms how, with a virtual PPA, the contract
will contain provisions by which the “developer pays the buyer if it can sell the
power into the market at a higher rate than the contract price, but if the market price
falls below that, the buyer must make up the difference.”101
97

AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 96, at 11 (“Thus, Physical PPAs
from utility-scale, off-site generation Projects will only be available in states that allow for
competitive retail energy sales to C&I customers as opposed to either (a) regulated markets
where only utilities can supply physical electricity to end-users or (b) competitive wholesale
markets that nonetheless do not allow for competitive retail sales to C&I customers by
Project owners.”).
98
See, e.g., Julian Spector, How MGM Prepared Itself to Leave Nevada’s Biggest
Utility, GREENTECHMEDIA (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read
/How-MGM-Prepared-Itself-to-Leave-Nevadas-Biggest-Utility#gs.wAmAXJo [https://per
ma.cc/7ZV6-3CXS].
99
See Sean Whaley, MGM Resorts to Leave Nevada Power, Pay $86.9M Exit Fee, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (May 19, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/energy/mgmresorts-to-leave-nevada-power-pay-86-9m-exit-fee/
[https://perma.cc/LHD5-86MC]
(explaining that the “hotel-casino relied on a 2001 law approved by the Nevada Legislature
allowing companies to leave as utility customers to lessen pressures on electricity rates
during an energy crisis”).
100
Sean Whaley, MGM, Wynn Resorts Meet Requirements to Leave Nevada Power, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (June 22, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/energy/mgmwynn-resorts-meet-requirements-to-leave-nevada-power/ [https://perma.cc/XC2V-PV6G]
(explaining that MGM Resorts would have to pay $86.9 million and Wynn Resorts $15.7
million). Note that these companies were seeking both natural gas and renewable electricity
on the wholesale market, not exclusively renewable. See Daniel Rothberg, MGM Resorts,
Wynn to Stop Purchasing NV Energy Power Saturday, LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2016/sep/30/mgm-resorts-wynn-stop-purchasing-nv-energypower/ [https://perma.cc/DT69-E3P9].
101
RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., supra note 94, at 25. The “synthetic” PPA
refers to the same basic financial arrangement but refers to situations where “the renewable
generation plant and the purchaser’s facilities are located in different ISOs.” Id. For an in-
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Large companies have used various versions of the virtual PPA concept in
traditionally regulated states served by a regional transmission authority.102 These
authorities, known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) or Independent
Service Operators (ISOs), run the wholesale electric power markets, operate
electricity transmission, and engage in transmission planning in regions covering
about 60 percent of the United States.103 For example, Google describes the “fixedfloating swap” arrangement it has used in traditionally regulated states within an
RTO or ISO footprint.104 With this carefully structured deal, Google has been able
to buy renewable energy from a developer via a virtual PPA, sell it into the wholesale
market where it purchases retail electricity from a utility, then retire the associated
RECs. 105 Accomplishing this is possible only for large companies with ample
resources. It is an advantage not available to smaller firms, whose interest in
renewable energy may be the same, but whose consumption does not approach a
utility-scale project’s capacity. It is also not possible in the same way in states
comprising the remaining 40 percent of the country presently without a regional
transmission operator.106
In sum, renewable energy purchasing, in one form or another, has been possible
for large electricity consumers for some time in restructured states. Combined with
more circuitous purchase models developed to overcome regulatory barriers,
corporate demand has fueled significant renewable development over the last five
years. To date, two primary factors drawing corporate buyers to a state are (1) full
or partial restructuring to allow retail choice to commercial and industrial customers,
as just noted, and (2) participation of the state in an RTO/ISO.107 It seems clear now
that states lacking one or both features—that is, traditionally regulated states, states
without an RTO/ISO, or states that have both those attributes—have a disadvantage
in attracting corporate renewable energy investments. In the years 2015 to 2016
alone, over 90 percent of corporate renewable energy deals reportedly occurred in
depth discussion of the complex legal considerations corporate buyers must consider in
evaluating a virtual PPA, see AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 96.
102
GOOGLE, supra note 1.
103
For a map depicting the RTO/ISO footprint, see Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp [https://perma.cc
/8T7F-P3QE] [hereinafter Regional Transmission Organizations].
104
GOOGLE, supra note 1, at 6–8.
105
GOOGLE, supra note 1; see also GOOGLE, GOOGLE’S GREEN PPAS: WHAT, HOW,
AND WHY 5 (2013), https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//green
/pdfs/renewable-energy.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5X5-NZ29].
106
For a visual depicture of which parts of the country are and are not within an RTO
footprint, see Regional Transmission Organizations, supra note 103.
107
See RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., supra note 94, at 11 (“A state’s
participation in an [ISO/RTO] . . . is also a key attractiveness favor; regional electricity
markets offer companies more options in their quest to procure RE.”). For a map showing
restructured states with retail choice, see State Electric Retail Choice Programs Are Popular
with Commercial and Industrial Customers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 14, 2012),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6250 [https://perma.cc/9D8X-6ZNA].
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restructured markets.108 The biggest obstacle elsewhere? According to Walmart—a
company that has actively participated in numerous state dockets related to corporate
access to renewables—it is “public policy.”109
Nonetheless, traditionally regulated states and the utilities operating there,
within and outside of regional markets, have attempted to respond to corporate
demand for renewable energy through reform.
B. State Reforms to Meet Corporate Demand
To date, some states have reaped greater benefits from corporate renewable
energy deals than others. This prompts the question—what is missing in status quo
legal regimes that makes them inadequate to corporate demand for renewables?
Attempting to provide an answer, large consumers and clean energy advocates are
now driving legal innovation designed to better meet corporate demand for clean
power, including in traditionally regulated states—with variable results. This
Section explains embedded barriers to renewable energy access in relation to states’
regulatory amenability to policy innovation in this sphere.
Consider the following contrast between Iowa and Kansas—both are
traditionally regulated states with a regional transmission authority, Iowa in the
Midwest Independent Service Operator (MISO), Kansas in the Southwest Power
Pool (SPP).110 According to a recent index ranking by RILA comparing state policy
environments for corporate clean energy procurement, Iowa ranked first, while
nearby Kansas ranked twenty points lower, coming in at twenty-first.111 Why the
difference? Iowa and Kansas are similar in their basic regulatory structure; both are
very windy, Kansas ranks second and Iowa, fifth for wind resource;112 and at the end
of 2018, they were ranked first (Kansas) and second (Iowa) for percentage of
electricity generated from wind.113 The difference in ranking, then, seemed to stem
108

AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 9.
WALMART, supra note 80.
110
See FERC, ENERGY PRIMER, supra note 10.
111
RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., supra note 94, at 8.
112
Jason Samenow, Blowing hard: The Windiest Time of Year and Other Fun Facts on
Wind, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capitalweather-gang/wp/2014/03/26/what-are-the-windiest-states-and-cities-what-is-d-c-s-windi
est-month/?utm_term=.6c31e2ca18c9 [https://perma.cc/7KZE-J9NP]; see also Wind Energy
Maps and Data, WINDEXCHANGE, https://windexchange.energy.gov/maps-data?category
=potential [https://perma.cc/VD76-U6T5].
113
See Kansas State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=KS [https://perma.cc/T5XC-Q4ZR] (last updated Mar. 21,
2019); State Fact Sheets – 2018 Wind Generation, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N
https://www.awea.org/resources/fact-sheets/state-facts-sheets
[https://perma.cc/EXR5QGBA] (last updated Jan. 2019). Note that in terms of total wind capacity (versus percentage
of in-state generation), Texas is by far the state leader at 22,799 MW, with the next closest
state, Oklahoma, having only 7,495 MW. See Wind Facts at a Glance, AM. WIND ENERGY
ASS’N, https://www.awea.org/windenergyfacts.aspx [https://perma.cc/UFW6-UQYT]. The
109
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from the policy environment that each state and the utilities operating there provided
for corporate buyers. Minnesota, similarly, has strong renewable potential and is
located within MISO, but it ranked even lower (thirty-first) in the RILA index,
despite numerous state-level efforts to cut carbon in its electricity sector.114 These
ranges underscore that traditionally regulated states with a robust renewable
resource—at least those in an RTO/ISO—are able to accommodate unmet corporate
demand if they put effective policies in place.
Although utilities and lawmakers in Kansas initially may not have seen the
opportunity as clearly as those in Iowa, growing corporate demand presents a
different angle on clean energy, both economically and politically. In September
2017, the state Department of Commerce and the Kansas-based Clean Energy
Business Council cosponsored an energy conference focusing significantly on
understanding corporate demand and the opportunities it presents for wind-rich
states.115 Two months later, Westar, the vertically integrated utility serving much of
Kansas, submitted to the Kansas Corporation Commission a new green tariff
proposal—titled a Direct Renewable Participation Service Tariff—designed to serve
companies that want direct access to clean power.116 With this change, Kansas would
undoubtedly rank higher on the RILA index. Utilities across several other states have
recently adopted or are considering similar measures, including Colorado, Georgia,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, all of which are traditionally regulated states
without retail choice, and some of which are not within an RTO/ISO footprint.117
top five states in terms of capacity are: (#1) Texas, (#2) Oklahoma, (#3) Iowa, (#4)
California, and (#5) Kansas. Id.
114
See RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., supra note 94, at 8.
115
The Clean Energy Business Council is a program of the Climate + Energy Project,
a Kansas-based nonprofit for which I serve as a member of the board of directors. CLIMATE
+ ENERGY PROJECT, www.climateandenergy.org [https://perma.cc/28ZY-X793].
116
Westar Energy, Inc., and Kansas Gas and Electric Company Application for
Approval of their Direct Renewable Participation Service Tariff, State Corpo. Comm’n of
Kan., (Docket No. 18-WSEE-190-TAR) (Nov. 6, 2017) (final order approving DRPS tariff)
[hereinafter Westar Energy Approval]. The tariff was approved in revised form in connection
with a specific wind farm project, which is now fully subscribed, with future projects
developed under the tariff to receive separate approval from the KCC. See id.
117
See PRIYA BARUA & CELINA BONUGLI, WORLD RESOURCES INST., EMERGING
GREEN TARIFFS IN US REGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 4 (2018),
http://www.wri.org/publication/emerging-green-tariffs-us-regulated-electricity-markets
[https://perma.cc/AHG6-ZF4M] (tracking new green tariff development across the states)
[hereafter WRI, EMERGING GREEN TARIFFS]. Virginia had retail choice for a time but
competition officially ended in 2009, but the state utility commission has allowed retail
customers to continue to buy 100% renewable energy from licensed providers if their
assigned utility does not offer such a program. See Energy Regulation in Virginia:
Competitive Service Providers and Aggregators, VIRGINIA STATE CORP. COMM’N, (July
2018),
https://scc.virginia.gov/power/compsup.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3P3X-PYYP].
Wisconsin is in MISO, and Missouri is partly within SPP, partly within MISO, and partly
outside either authority. New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wyoming are all mostly
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For many companies, what is missing under status quo legal regimes is captured
in the Corporate Renewable Energy Buyers’ Principles developed by the Renewable
Energy Business Alliance, providing criteria for policy changes that will help
companies meet their goals.118 This is a good starting place, because of the number
of corporate entities that have signed on to the Buyers’ Principles, but also because
policymakers and utilities are beginning to pay attention.119 For example, Westar’s
green tariff proposal to the Kansas Corporation Commission cites the Buyers’
Principles, including it as an attachment with the submission.120
The Buyers’ Principles are useful for what they convey about how law and
policy might evolve in traditionally regulated states. These six Principles center on
companies’ desire for (1) choice in their source of electricity, (2) access to costcompetitive renewable resources, (3) access to longer term, fixed price
arrangements, (4) additionality—“[a]ccess to new projects that reduce emissions
beyond business as usual,” (5) simplified approval processes and third-party
financing for renewable energy projects, and (6) innovative collaborations with
utilities and regulators.121
Companies dissatisfied with what their utilities provide want expanded choice
for consumers, like the retail choice already existing in a minority of states.122 Short
of undertaking state regulatory restructuring, which incumbent utilities typically
oppose, retail competition may not be possible in traditionally regulated states,
which leaves these states, their utilities, and utility commissions to create options
that approximate the benefits choice provides through other means consistent with
their regulatory structure.
The second Buyers’ Principle is cost competitiveness, between traditional and
renewable energy rates.123 There have been “green” pricing programs in place for
some time designed to give companies 100 percent renewable energy, but they have
been generally based on unbundled RECs and have entailed a fixed premium price
on top of existing rates.124 Today, corporate customers want rates that actually reflect
without an RTO, though small portions of eastern New Mexico and northwestern Wyoming
are in SPP, a small portion of southwest Nevada is in the California ISO (CAISO), and a
small portion of northeast North Carolina is in PJM, which includes nearly all of Virginia.
Colorado, Georgia, Utah, and Washington have no RTO/ISO. See FERC, ENERGY PRIMER,
supra note 10.
118
The Principles, CORP. RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS’ ALLIANCE,
https://buyersprinciples.org/principles/
[https://perma.cc/JV3N-LMW4]
[hereinafter
REBA].
119
According to REBA, “[a]s of June 2018, 75 companies have signed on, representing
over 69 million MWh of annual demand by 2020.” See About Us, CORP. RENEWABLE
ENERGY BUYERS ALLIANCE, https://buyersprinciples.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/8CB8ANRY].
120
Westar Energy Approval, supra note 116.
121
REBA, supra note 118.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See PRIYA BARUA, WORLD RES. INST. (WRI), IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR
UTILITIES: DESIGNING RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCTS TO MEET LARGE ENERGY
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the falling cost of renewables and do not want to pay a higher price that has no clear
connection to what the utility pays for the power. Westar had this kind of program
in place for commercial and industrial consumers for many years—and it had zero
participants.125
The third Buyers’ Principle—access to long-term, fixed-price arrangements—
represents companies’ recognition that, when renewable energy costs are low, these
contracts can stabilize their energy expenditures at a favorable level. As customers
of vertically integrated utilities, the benefits of low-cost renewables have not
measurably reduced the rates they pay. The ability to sign long-term, fixed-price
contracts directly is significant for companies hoping to hedge against volatile
electricity prices, and they see direct access to renewable developers as key to this
protection.
In this context, additionality, the fourth Buyers’ Principle, means, in simplest
terms, bringing new renewable energy projects to the grid.126 Companies signed on
to the Buyers’ Principles share a common aspiration: “We would like our efforts to
result in new renewable power generation.” 127 They want to use their high
consumption to drive renewable energy development, hence the shift away from
reliance on unbundled RECs linked to existing facilities. For carbon reduction, this
is critical—the environmental value of legal reform in this area, and the potential for
CUSTOMER NEEDS 3 (2017), http://www.wri.org/publication/implementation-guide-greentariffs [https://perma.cc/994W-YARH] [hereinafter WRI, IMPLEMENTATION] (elaborating
on the difference between new green tariffs and earlier green power programs); see also CTR.
FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., UTILITY GREEN POWER OPTION (2016); Green Pricing
Programs, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/document/
green-pricing-programs/ [https://perma.cc/CD6V-JEQN].
125
Westar Energy Approval, supra note 116, at ¶ 4 (discussing Wind Generation
Service, designed for commercial and industrial customers seeking wind energy, but which
has no subscribers “because the WGS price is significantly higher than the current market
price of wind generation”).
126
The concept of additionality is presented very simply here, consistent with the way
the term is being used in general discussion of the evolving corporate demand for clean
power. Additionality has a deeper significance, however, and much more complexity in the
context of international climate change treaty negotiations, in which the concept plays a
central role in determining under what circumstances an emissions reduction is validly
attributed to a given action. For a recent attempt to clarify the appropriate use of this
terminology, see LETHA TAWNEY ET AL., DESCRIBING PURCHASER IMPACT IN THE U.S.
VOLUNTARY RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKETS 2 (2018). For more on additionality as the
concept is employed in the climate policy context, see generally U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
CHALLENGES TO CARBON OFFSET QUALITY (2011) (addressing issues with additionality in
the context of emissions cap and trade systems); Charlotte Streck, Ensuring New Finance
and Real Emission Reduction: A Critical Review of the Additionality Concept, 2011 CARBON
& CLIMATE L. REV. 158 (2011) (summarizing arguments framing additionality debates
related to emissions reduction and finance under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol).
127
REBA, supra note 118.
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broader public benefits resulting from this trend, depends on new renewable energy
coming onto the grid. Companies are increasingly expressing interest in energy
facilities near their operations to localize their impact so that it is trusted, visible,
and benefits the local community while enhancing the regional grid.128
The fifth Buyers’ Principle—access to third-party financing—is especially
important to companies seeking to add renewable energy systems on-site. In states
that allow third-party financing for rooftop solar, for example, adding a system can
become feasible by eliminating the large up-front cost that may be hard to justify,
especially for smaller firms. In many traditionally regulated states, third-party
financing is not permitted, or the law is unclear, leaving demand for distributed
generation unmet.129
Finally, the Principle of innovation and collaboration with utilities reflects
companies’ recognition that in traditionally regulated states, utility cooperation is
essential to advancing their goals. Unsurprisingly, for these states, the primary arena
for reform has been the state public utility commission (PUC), where utilities seek
approval for tariffs and other programs affecting the cost and sale of retail electricity.
Utilities, PUCs, and legislatures in some traditionally regulated states have
begun responding to large customers’ dissatisfaction with stale green pricing
programs and unbundled RECs. The Advanced Energy Economy Institute groups
policy reforms into two broad categories: first, those that facilitate access to
renewable energy off-site and second, those that support greater access to on-site
development.130 The following account of recent state-level reform efforts, although
not exhaustive, highlights emerging policy models and conveys the degree of
variability that continues to characterize corporate access to renewables across the
states.
1. Access to Renewable Energy Off-site
Utilities in traditionally regulated states are in a delicate position in the face of
corporate demand for renewables. On the one hand, they have an economic interest
in their existing fleet of electric power plants, which in many states still mostly run
on coal and natural gas, with some also relying on nuclear power. 131 This helps
explain some utilities’ resistance to making commitments to new renewable energy
projects and the premium rate structure that dominated early green pricing programs.
At the same time, utilities are also keenly interested in new large customers and
continuing to provide electricity to their largest customers, with the Nevada casinos’
128

Id.
For resources on third-party solar financing, see Third Party Solar Financing,
SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY ASS’N, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/third-party-solarfinancing [https://perma.cc/6XFU-2Q7Z] (providing links to a range of other sources).
130
See AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5.
131
Thirty states have a nuclear power plant, with nuclear power accounting for 19
percent of electricity nationwide. See Nuclear Explained: Nuclear Powerplant, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=nucl
ear_power_plants [https://perma.cc/W23P-D7HS].
129
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defection—a loss of 4.86 percent of Nevada Power’s energy sales—looming as a
possibility that could repeat elsewhere. 132 At the same time, they share states’
interest in attracting new large customers to their territory, if they can do so
profitably.
In the face of current trends in corporate renewable energy ambitions, several
state PUCs have evaluated and approved new green tariffs (rate models) that align
more closely with the Buyers’ Principles. As with every state-level legal instrument,
there is variability one to the next, but emerging models are typically in the form of
a tariff or rider submitted by a utility for administrative approval to the state PUC.
Such a tariff will apply to identified classes of consumers in lieu of or in addition to
other applicable rates and, at its most basic, allow a large consumer to purchase
renewable energy together with its bundled RECs. The World Resources Institute’s
research in this area traces the first of the new green tariffs to 2013, with at least
fifteen additional states (and counting) enacting or considering utility proposals in
the same vein.133
A common instrument design used in the new green tariffs is a “sleeved” PPA,
converting what would otherwise be a contract between a corporate buyer and
renewable energy developer into a three-party transaction, with the utility acting as
intermediary to effectuate the deal with PUC approval. 134 This results in an
individualized tariff, replacing the standard rates applicable to the corporate
consumer with the low-cost renewable energy it negotiated.
A second, newer variation allows a utility to aggregate commercial or industrial
customers to make a large-scale renewable energy project feasible, developed by the
utility or through a utility-developer PPA.135 This model is better for consumers with
lower electricity needs in the utility’s territory—not every company consumes at a
scale that would warrant a sleeved PPA. Under this subscriber model, Puget Sound
Energy in Washington entered a renewable energy PPA, with approval from the state
PUC, to cover multiple corporate buyers’ usage, passing on the benefit of the lowcost PPA to the buyers.136 This provides some of the key benefits outlined in the
Buyers’ Principles through an arrangement tailored to a traditional regulatory

132

See Whaley, supra note 100. Although the casinos still pay for utility grid services
provided by the utility, the utility lost them as electricity customers. See Rothberg, supra
note 100.
133
WRI, EMERGING GREEN TARIFFS, supra note 117, at 2. The WRI report, which is
periodically updated, contains detailed fact sheets for each of the states included, complete
with links to relevant state PUC dockets. See id. at 5–39.
134
For more on this and other green tariff models, see generally AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES,
supra note 5, at 9; and WRI, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 124.
135
For general discussion of this model, see Herman K. Trabish, Green Designs:
Corporate Demand Pushes New Generation of Utility Green Tariffs, UTILITY DIVE (May 4,
2017),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/green-designs-corporate-demand-pushes-newgeneration-of-utility-green-tari/441580/ [https://perma.cc/F66L-LFP6].
136
See PUGET SOUND ENERGY, SCHEDULE NO. 139: VOLUNTARY LONG TERM
RENEWABLE ENERGY PURCHASE RIDER, WN U-60 (2016).
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environment. This tariff is reportedly the first among new green tariffs to offer this
model and extend it to retailers as well as smaller local governments.137
A third emerging model that depends on access to an RTO/ISO-administrated
wholesale electricity market passes along the wholesale market price for electricity
to the customer. World Resources Institute explains these market-based rate
programs in simple terms: after a company signs a PPA for renewable energy
bundled with its RECs, its vertically integrated utility sells the energy into the market
on the customer’s behalf and credits the customer with the wholesale market price
for the energy received.138
These policy developments suggest that the scale of corporate demand is
leading companies to look beyond restructured states to push for deals and tariff
structures that approximate access to renewables in states operating with traditional
regulatory regimes.
2. Access to On-site Renewable Energy
Corporate demand for large-scale off-site renewable energy is the primary
driver behind recent policy developments in this area, but it is important to recognize
the need for reform to facilitate greater on-site renewable generation for large energy
users as well. According to RILA, over 65 percent of companies planning to procure
renewable energy intend to pursue on-site solar. 139 This represents significant
potential expansion of distributed solar power, and yet regulatory barriers persist
that will hinder this growth in many states without change.
Most states have policies in place that support on-site energy generation
(commonly referred to as distributed generation, or DG), but as research by the
Advanced Energy Economy Institute shows, many do not meet the needs of large
consumers and limit their participation. 140 For example, in states with restrictive
capacity limits for DG systems, commercial and industrial customers are limited in

137
Letha Tawney, Washington State Pioneers New Model for Utility-Scale Renewable
Energy, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (April 18, 2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/wash
ington-state-pioneers-new-model-utility-scale-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/X5AGKM9E].
138
See WRI, EMERGING GREEN TARIFFS, supra note 117, at 5 (citing Dominion Energy
in PJM and Omaha Public Power District in SPP as examples of utilities that have
experimented with this model). An additional model is a direct access tariff. AEEI,
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 2. The Advanced Energy Economy Institute explains that
this model allows “certain customers in traditionally regulated states, most frequently large
energy users, to choose to purchase power from an energy supplier rather than the local
distribution utility.” Id. This model does not have to facilitate RE but can be used to do so. Id.
139
RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., supra note 94, at 28.
140
AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 10–12.
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how much of their demand they can meet on-site.141 Thus, a recommended policy
reform is to raise system size limits to allow large electricity consumers to maximize
on-site generation and thereby reduce how much power has to be delivered via the
grid.142
Regulatory restrictions on third-party ownership of DG systems is another
barrier to realizing the full potential of on-site energy. Nearly half of states allow
third-party ownership, including Iowa, Illinois, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas;
all the Northeastern states; and most of the Pacific coast, giving companies a
streamlined option to add renewable energy to their facilities—the third-party
installs the system on the buyer’s property, but continues to own and maintain the
system while selling the electricity to the company via a PPA. This is easier for many
corporate consumers, just as it would be for a residential customer—it eliminates
significant up-front costs because the third party has ready financing, technical
capabilities for installation and maintenance, and experience seeking local permits
and related approvals.143 It should be noted that some solar companies offering thirdparty financing have come under fire for deceptive practices, stripping the RECs
from installed systems in the fine print of the contracts with unwitting solar
customers so they can resell to other buyers.144 To legally count on-site generation
toward a renewable energy target, of course, a company would have to purchase
electricity from the system with its RECs. In states where third-party ownership is
disallowed—including Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, Arizona, and most of the northern
Great Plains, Northwest, and South—installing a DG system may be less attractive
due to local permitting complexities and more significant up-front costs.145
A third area in which reforms can facilitate corporate access to on-site
renewable energy relates to how electricity is metered between the utility and the
consumer. The concept of aggregated or virtual net energy metering helps
companies make the most of an on-site renewable system by allowing them to use
electricity generated from a single system across multiple-metered buildings.146 In
141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
See Kevin B. Jones et al., Do You Know Who Owns Your Solar Energy? The
Growing Practice of Separating Renewable Attributes from Renewable Energy Development
and Its Impact on Meeting Our Climate Goals, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 197, 207–10
(2017) (discussing the problems and deceptive practice of unbundling RECs from rooftop
solar sales).
145
See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY & U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, 3RD PARTY SOLAR PV POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT (PPA) 1 (2018),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DSIRE_3rd-PartyPPA_March_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR7J-BZFN] (depicting states where third-party
ownership/third party-PPAs are allowed, disallowed, or uncertain for distributed generation).
For more on the legal issues related to third-party solar PPAs generally, as well as with a
focus on one state context, see generally Andrew J. Haile, Solar Financing in North
Carolina: The Untapped Potential of Power Purchase Agreements, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1599
(2017).
146
AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 12.
142
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the same way, this reform helps owners of multi-unit residential buildings install a
system that can cut costs across separately metered apartments.147 In the many states
that have net energy metering policies in place, raising caps on usage to include
commercial and industrial customers and authorizing virtual metering will expand
access to on-site renewables.
As the foregoing underscores, policy reforms in place or under consideration
across the states have the potential, if well-designed and -implemented, to drive onand off-site renewable energy development. There is also the potential for poorly
designed programs to be ineffective, lead to continued use of unbundled RECS, and
perform something of a greenwashing function for companies focused on image.148
In ways that have been underappreciated, these innovations raise a range of broader
policy questions relevant to the role of corporate demand for clean power in the
electricity sector’s low-carbon transition.
III. VALUE AND RISKS FOR THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION
As big-name brands, as employers, as economic drivers, as political actors –
multinational companies have the ability to get attention for the issues that matter to
them. Their growing demand for renewable energy is important for the low-carbon
transition because their consumption is so high – successfully shifting their usage
away from fossil fuels could play a key role in accelerating the electric power
industry’s reorientation toward zero-carbon renewable resources. The trend has
taken on even more importance given the turn away from low-carbon priorities at
the federal level.
This demand does not exist in a vacuum, however – policy reforms designed to
accommodate it emerge from within the electricity sector’s complex and preexisting physical and legal infrastructure. As new green tariffs and other models for
access emerge, state policymakers should take a more active role in assessing the
value as well as potential risks of this trend. This section first clarifies what “100
percent renewable” claims really mean – a threshold issue for understanding policy
147

See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ET AL., VIRTUAL NET METERING POLICY
BACKGROUND
AND
TARIFF
SUMMARY
REPORT
31–33
(2015),
https://irecusa.org/publications/virtual-net-metering-policy-background-and-tariff-summ
ary-report/ [https://perma.cc/CT6H-6MLC].
148
Many of the same companies being celebrated for renewable energy
accomplishments simultaneously contribute to a wide-range of harmful environmental and
social impacts, from primary material sourcing and waste disposal to labor practices. See
Stephanie Clifford, Wal-Mart Is Fined $82 Million over Mishandling of Hazardous Wastes,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/business/wal-mart-isfined-82-million-over-mishandling-of-hazardous-wastes.html
[https://perma.cc/M8ZLGMDP]; see also Todd C. Frankel, The Cobalt Pipeline: Tracing the Path from Deadly
Hand-Dug Mines in Congo to Consumers’ Phones and Laptops, WASH. POST (Sept. 30,
2016). In 2017, Apple stated a goal to develop “more efficient recycling technologies and
other innovations” so that “one day [the company] can stop mining the earth altogether.”
APPLE, supra note 75, at 20.
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reform possibilities as well as accurate communication with the public. It then
considers some of the issues these reforms raise from the perspective of advancing
the low-carbon transition – in particular, implications for emissions reduction,
energy decision-making, transmission planning, policy messaging, and equity
concerns.
A. Understanding “100 Percent Renewable” Claims
Headlines touting “100 percent renewable” 149 in the US paint a somewhat
misleading picture for those unfamiliar with how the electric grid functions.
Electricity generated from the blowing wind or from burning coal is the same when
it is added to the grid. Thus, any grid-connected company, factory, or residence
draws power from a mix of sources.
Recall the Advanced Energy Economy Institute estimate that 450 GW of
renewable energy could be developed by meeting half the nation’s commercial and
industrial electricity demand with renewable electric power – that represents a
potentially dramatic change in the US energy portfolio and significant emission
reduction. 150 It is important to understand, however, that even if the 450 GW is
developed at the behest of a group of companies whose electricity consumption
exactly matches 450 GW, those companies are not using “100 percent renewable”
energy if they are grid-connected to electricity generated from all sources.
More importantly – and this is often lost in discussions of corporate demand for
clean power – these companies still depend on the availability of fossil and nuclear
energy resources to ensure constant service for their high electricity needs. Thus, it
is not just a matter of locational fiat – they are claiming 100 percent renewable
energy but in reality they still require uninterrupted service which, for now, is still
guaranteed with natural gas, coal, and nuclear power plants. The “100 percent
renewable” claims tend to obscure this fact, which is important to understand to
avoid inflated perceptions of corporate accomplishments or, worse, a false sense of
progress in the low-carbon transition. Recognizing this does not diminish the value
of companies’ efforts to drive new renewable energy development, but it is essential
to keep discourse around this trend grounded with accuracy and a clear
understanding of what still needs to be done to decarbonize multinationals and,
ultimately, the electric grid.
To their credit, many large companies clarify what is missing from the
headlines in public documents about their renewable energy activities. For example,
Google provides a forthright explanation of the limits of its 100 percent renewable
announcement: “The reality of today’s electricity grid means that we are unable to
power our operations directly from wind and solar farms during every hour of the
day.” 151 So when Apple states the following in its most recent Environmental
Responsibility Report – “In 2018, we reached a major milestone: 100 percent of the
149

See, e.g., Apple Renewables, supra note 47; Price, supra note 48.
AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 4.
151
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electricity we use at all of our facilities comes from renewable resources”152 – that
is factually inaccurate. The company may have matched its electricity consumption
with a combination of on- and offsite renewable energy facilities and RECs, and
thereby helped increase renewable energy on the electric grid overall, but it still uses
and needs mixed-source electricity at its facilities around the world through
interconnection with the grid.
Over time, reliance on the grid will mean something different, as energy storage
technologies and advanced energy efficiency and demand response measures
expand their impact on grid function. FERC Order 841 in early 2018 created a
structure for energy storage resources to participate in US wholesale capacity,
energy, and ancillary services markets.153 Order 841 has been called a “grid gamechanger” that creates certainty for investors and will accelerate renewable energy
development by counteracting renewables’ intermittency. 154 Global growth for
utility-scale energy storage is expected to double six times by 2030, driven by the
demand for higher renewable energy portfolios and national commitments to cut
energy emissions under the Paris Accord.155
In the interim, it is important to qualify what “100 percent renewable” means
on the grid we have today – for policy makers and for the public – even if it may
mean something different in the coming decades.156
B. Emissions Reduction and Additionality
Companies’ emerging preference for new renewable energy development
(additionality) over unbundled RECs is critical to the trend’s significance in the lowcarbon shift. Buying RECs does not minimize electricity price volatility, offers far
less financial support for renewable energy projects, and does not represent any
actual change in operations or genuine emissions offset when the RECs are being
sold as property rights stripped from an existing facility.157 This is one of the clear
152

APPLE, supra note 75, at 7.
Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (Feb. 15, 2018) (final
rule).
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See Keith Goldberg, FERC Energy Storage Rule Is a Grid Game-Changer, LAW360
(Feb. 16, 2018, 9:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1013613/ferc-energy-storagerule-is-a-grid-game-changer [https://perma.cc/4LKP-MV2A].
155
See Jeff St. John, Global Energy Storage to Double 6 Times by 2030, Matching
Solar’s Spectacular Rise, GREENTECHMEDIA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.
com/articles/read/global-energy-storage-double-six-times-by-2030-matching-solar-spectac
ular#gs.=zl8yVc [https://perma.cc/2N9W-289X] (citing Bloomberg New Energy Finance).
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As this Article was going to press, the Environmental Law Institute released a
helpful and accessible guide to 100 percent renewable claims of particular companies that is
recommended for further reading. See Corporate Statements About the Use of Renewable
Energy: What Does “100% Renewable” Goal Really Mean?, ENVTL. L. INST (Feb. 2019),
https://www.eli.org/news/corporate-statements-about-use-renewable-energy-what-does-100
-renewable-goal-really-mean [https://perma.cc/F99M-KU2R].
157
See RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASS’N ET AL., supra note 94, at 17.
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benefits of onsite renewable systems – they always meet this standard so long as the
RECs are bundled with the onsite energy they generate.158
For the new green tariffs designed for offsite renewables, additionality should
be a central design consideration, and a key feature that differentiates the new
models from the older green pricing programs. This element may not always be a
convenient requirement from the utilities’ perspective – they may already have
enough generating capacity and be reluctant to pursue more. To date, the new tariffs
have mostly been developed by utilities and submitted to utility commissions for
approval, so the pressure to design instruments with additionality comes primarily
from the companies – and, more indirectly, from policymakers encouraging utilities
to work with companies. This rather passive policy environment underscores the
importance of asking a question that seems mostly to be going unasked: What
policies should the reforms in this sphere serve?
If a new green tariff is seen purely as a state economic development strategy,
designed to attract new business to the state, additionality is only really necessary if
and to the extent companies demand it. This perspective would make it more likely,
for instance, for a tariff to be presented on a case-by-case basis, rather than as a
program open generally to corporate consumers.159 If, by contrast, a green tariff is
seen as an opportunity to leverage companies’ electricity consumption to cut state
emissions, this distinct policy objective would guide instrument design toward
broader access for large consumers. This perspective would value additionality for
its own sake, rather than through the lens of what makes the tariff appealing to a
particular set of corporate actors.
In light of nuanced policy considerations, parties to tariff dockets (companies,
consumer, environmental, and clean energy advocates) must analyze the effect of
new green tariffs and the likelihood they will be effective, knowing utilities are
occupying a conflicted space.160 Utilities are in the position to largely define what
158

See id. at 28.
See, e.g., Letter from S. Bryan Kleinmaier, Stafford Rosenbaum, LLP, to Sandra J.
Paske, Secretary of Commission, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (June 21, 2017),
http://apps.psc.wi.gov/vs2015/ERF_view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=305439 [https://perma.cc/F
CL7-MTC9] (noting that MGE emphasized that the renewable energy rider tariff “does not
specify that the energy purchased will be additional renewable energy”).
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Companies, consumer advocates, and clean energy supporters regularly participate
in utility commission proceedings related to renewable energy tariffs. For example,
participants in the docket for Missouri’s new green tariff, approved in June 2018, included
utility Ameren Missouri, Missouri Division of Energy, Missouri Industrial Energy
Consumers, Natural Resources Defense Council, Office of the Public Council, Renew
Missouri, Sierra Club, Union Electric Company, Wal-Mart Stores East, Wind on the Wires.
See Application of Union Elec. Co. d/b/a Ameren Missouri for Approval of 2017 Green
Tariff, No. ET-2018-0063 (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/Filing_Sub
mission/DocketSheet/docket_sheet.asp?caseno=ET-2018-0063&pagename=case_filing_
submission_FList.asp [https://perma.cc/ST87-UDJK]. Participants in Oregon’s ongoing
green tariff docket include utilities Pacific General Electric Co. and Pacific Power, Alliance
of Western Energy Consumers, Avangrid Renewables, Northwest & Intermountain Power
Producers Coalition, NW Energy Coalition, Oregon Citizens Utility Board, Renewable NW,
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works for them in traditional regulatory regimes – most typically, they submit
proposals to the utility commission, for approval or disapproval, and although they
may not always get exactly what they ask for, they have set the parameters for the
dialogue. It bears noting, too, that not all companies are equally concerned with
additionality, though the Buyers’ Principles make it a key criterion for new policy
to meet signatories’ needs.161 This makes objective analysis of emerging reforms
essential to ensure they achieve additionality and advance the low-carbon shift.
Finally, it must be emphasized that, despite unbundled RECs beginning to fall
out of favor, they are still the dominant sourcing strategy for companies pledging
100 percent renewable targets. According to RE100, with its growing membership,
arguably representing the most ambitious companies, the reliance on unbundled
RECs is falling, but it is still significant in the US – in 2015, it accounted for 85
percent of all claimed renewable energy for surveyed companies, then dropping to
59 percent in 2016 as PPAs and new green tariffs came into more common use.162
As effective alternatives are developed at the state level, connecting consumers
with additional renewable energy projects across more states, it can be expected that
unbundled RECs will continue to diminish in their role. For most companies today,
however, “100 percent renewable” claims remain heavily dependent on unbundled
RECs, which do much less to change electricity generation from the status quo.
C. Energy Decision-Making
Corporate demand for clean power presents a number of challenges to
traditional energy institutions and structures for decision-making. State energy
policy derives from a number of sources – legislative action, public utility
commissions, the governor’s office, utilities, departments of commerce or economic
development may play a role, and some states have dedicated offices for energy
policy.163 Anything driving major energy decisions, including via private contract,
has policy implications, and this is certainly true in regard to the scale of new
renewable projects driven by corporate demand – 12 GW between 2013 and mid
2018, according to the Rocky Mountain Institute Business Renewables Center,
which helps facilitate and tracks corporate offsite renewable energy deals. 164
Although large electricity consumers have been uniquely positioned within utility
and Walmart. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Investigation into Proposed Green Tariff., No.
18-260 (July 3, 2018), https://apps.puc.state.or.us/edockets/Docket.asp?DocketID=21421&
Child=servlist [https://perma.cc/PQT9-VQT2].
161
REBA, supra note 118.
162
RE100, supra note 50, at 30. Apple, by contrast, reports that “66 percent of the
renewable energy [it] procures comes from projects that Apple created.” APPLE, supra note
75, at 9.
163
See, e.g., Sanva Carley & Tyler R. Browne, Innovative U.S. Energy Policy: A
Review of a State’s Policy Experiences, 00 WIRES ENERGY & ENV’T 1, 1–2 (2012).
164
Corporate Renewable Deals 2014 – 2018, ROCKY MTN. INST. BUS. RENEWABLES
CTR., http://businessrenewables.org/corporate-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/4TRP-NNR7]
(covering offsite deals only).
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regulation, the current trend represents a significant expansion of this role into one
that influences power generation portfolios and energy policy from the demand side.
This shifting role aligns with a broader transition in the energy sector toward
decentralized energy generation and decision-making, disorienting traditional
demarcations between utility and consumer. A number of scholars have recently
considered implications of emerging “prosumers” – consumers who act both as
passive customers as well as active producers when they have onsite renewable
energy systems that feed back into the grid.165 Companies seeking direct access to
renewables may be prosumers to the extent they generate onsite electricity and
participate in net-metering, but they are altering the consumer role more
significantly still. Rather than being active in one sense and passive in the other,
many companies are becoming active in both registers – actively generating their
own electricity and (1) actively negotiating new consumer relationships with utilities
to change how electricity they buy is generated, or (2) working around regulatory
barriers without utility cooperation to get what they want.166 With economic and
political heft that residential customers lack, they are able to influence both
distributed and centralized, utility-scale power generation.
This influence further disperses energy decision-making, and includes private
actors to a greater extent in increasingly significant energy decisions. Because the
trend in corporate demand is for clean power, this change is rightly celebrated for
aligning market forces with public policy goals to reduce carbon reduction. At the
same time, how reforms are crafted to meet this demand, and by whom, are questions
that implicate public participation, policy aims, and effective governance. Yet state
legislatures have mostly played a passive role in the face of this trend, rather than
guiding the development of new green tariffs or engaging how large, privately
contracted PPAs for electric power may affect state policy and grid modernization
strategies. 167 Although approving new green tariffs and related proposals from
165

See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 521–22 (2017)
(defining prosumers as “consumers in the traditional, passive sense who also produce goods
or services for sale in the energy marketplace,” and detailing the disconnection between the
Federal Power Act’s structure and modern developments such as distributed generation and
more active consumer participation on the grid); see also Ahmad Faruqui & Mariko
Geronimo Aydin, Moving Forward with Electricity Tariff Reform, 2017 REGULATION 42, 42
(noting how retail tariff reform is needed to account for residential customers’ entry into a
“transactive energy” marketplace) and Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, U. COLO. L.
REV. 87 (2016) (on customer electricity generation and storage and regulatory approaches to
integrate demand side resources for enhance grid reliability). But see Shelley Welton,
Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 602–11 (2018) (questioning the
fairness and efficacy of consumer-based decision-making in the electricity sector).
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See, e.g., REBA, supra note 118.
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For example, companies pushed for legislation in Missouri 2017 for corporate
access to large-scale renewable energy via third-party PPAs, but the bill—“Missouri Energy
Freedom Act”—was introduced and made it no further. See Missouri Energy Freedom Act,
H.B. 439, 99th Leg. Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/text/HB439/id/14
45606 [https://perma.cc/4QVC-2MYJ]. Missouri Utility Ameren, however, took the concept
to the PUC and received approval for a subscription based green tariff for commercial and
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utilities is within the general authority of state PUCs, 168 there has been little
legislative guidance for how PUCs should evaluate the purpose or policy objectives
of instruments designed to meet private corporate goals.
For states with reforms limited to the PUC context, it represents a missed
opportunity in several respects. First, the legislative process engages a broader
public than administrative proceedings before utility commissions. Although a PUC
docket may provide opportunities for written public comment as well as comment
at a public hearing, there is inevitably a much smaller circle of active participants,
and such proceedings often receive little media attention. In contrast to legislative
engagement with matters of energy policy, which will involve lawmakers from
across a state in communication with their constituents, a tariff application pending
in a PUC is framed as a narrow pricing request pertaining to a set of electricity
customers. Unlike the typical rate case, which in most instances can be appropriately
framed in this way, legal mechanisms that will spur large-scale renewable energy
development and benefit large corporate customers set policy – policy that, ideally,
would be thoughtfully integrated with a state’s energy planning and generation
portfolio, and with a concern for the public interest, broadly conceived. A legislative
dialogue could evaluate how and under what conditions it is beneficial to a state and
its residents to afford companies access to state renewable resources. This contrasts
with the posture of a PUC evaluating a tariff proposal developed by an investorowned utility, understandably with its own revenue needs and internal capital
priorities foremost in mind. PUCs evaluate utility proposals against a standard that
is typically localized to what is just and reasonable as between utilities and
ratepayers, 169 with a focus on how the new tariff will recover costs for the utility and

industrial customers with 2.5 MW or more in electricity demand. Application of Union
Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri for Approval of 2017 Green Tariff, No. ET-20180063 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 12, 2018) (second non-unanimous stipulation); see
Jeffrey Tomich, Midwest Regulators Approve Wind Subscription Program, ENERGYWIRE
(June 28, 2018), https://eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060087209/print [https://perma.cc/
A287-75LG]. This observation of low legislative engagement is further supported by
research using the Advanced Energy Economic PowerSuite databases of advanced energy
bills enacted in state legislatures (excluding bills that were not signed into law) and public
utility commission dockets; POWERSUITE, www.powersuite.aee.net [https://perma.cc/MA83
-U9EY] (subscription based).
168
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101 (2018) (giving the Kansas Corporation
Commission “full power, authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the electric
public utilities doing business in Kansas,” and empowering it “to do all things necessary and
convenient for the exercise of such power, authority and jurisdiction”).
169
State utility commissions typically apply a standard in proceedings related to retail
rates that mirrors the Federal Power Act’s requirement that wholesale rates are just and
reasonable and non-discriminatory. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a)–(b) (2017); see also, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 66-101b (2017) (showing how this standard applies at the state level, the
Kansas Corporation Commission to ensure “just and reasonable rates” and declaring any
“unjust or unreasonable discriminatory or unduly preferential rule, regulation, classification,
rate, charge or exaction” to be “unlawful and void”).
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from whom.170 Broader questions that could be considered in a legislative process –
effective generation and transmission planning, for example, or equity concerns,
both discussed below, as well as additionality conditions and project siting criteria
– are more likely to go unaddressed.
There are some exceptions, but the contrast only reinforces these points. In
2014, the Oregon legislature directed the PUC to “conduct a study to consider the
impact of allowing electric companies to offer voluntary renewable energy tariffs to
their nonresidential customers.”171 In doing so, the legislature outlined factors to
guide the PUC’s considerations, including: whether such a tariff would promote
development of significant renewable energy resources; what impacts, “including
any potential cost-shifting,” it could have on other customer classes; and whether
electricity would be obtained via competitive procurement.172 The bill required that
no costs associated with such a tariff could be borne by other customers, and it barred
renewable energy sources developed for the tariff from being double-counted toward
the state’s renewable portfolio standard, thereby promoting additionality.173 Other
exceptions include Virginia and Utah legislatures, which have recently enacted laws
that lend support, if less directly, for renewable energy deals between large electric
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See generally Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
371 (2014) (surveying PUCs institutional development and demonstrating how case law has
reinforced the economic focus that dominates PUC decision-making to the exclusion of
environmental and other policy considerations). But cf. Michael Dworkin et al., The
Environmental Duties of Public Utilities Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 326–
34 (2001) (countering the “common misconception that public utility commissions are solely
economic regulators” by showing examining state statutes defining the contours of PUC
authority in all 50 states). There are certainly examples of creative policy making by PUCs
beyond strictly economic regulation of the industry. See, e.g., Alan Ramo & Deborah Behles,
Transitioning a Community Away from Fossil-Fuel Generation to a Green Economy: An
Approach Using State Utility Commission Authority, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 518–
22 (2014) (detailing how the California Public Utility Commission redirected funds from
unused federal acid rain program allowances from closed Mohave generating station to help
Navajo and Hopi tribes affected by the closure to develop renewable energy).
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H.B. 4126 § 3(2), 77th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014).
172
Id. § 3(3).
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consumers and utilities. 174 More states, however, are developing tariffs through
utility commission proceedings with little direct legislative involvement.175
Policymakers may become more engaged if they understand how reforms can
spur renewable energy growth and economic development in their state. In a recent
report anchoring policy approaches more concretely to the potential they have in
particular states, the Advanced Energy Economy Institute (AEEI) analyzed
commercial and industrial electricity consumption across the states to determine
where each policy adoption would yield the best returns.176 Seeking to engage state
policymakers, AEEI uses a policy opportunity index to rank states with the clearest
opportunities to increase corporate access to renewable energy through reforms
amenable to their existing regulatory structures.177 For example, the five states with
the most to be gained with policy interventions increasing access to large offsite
purchases include California, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, and Minnesota, based on
the gap between current large customer electricity consumption in each state with
its present renewable energy capacity. 178 Legislative action is likely required for
some of these reforms to be adopted, but not necessarily all – in either instance,
integrated energy policy lead by elected officials, and with space for broader public
participation, is preferable to reforms limited to utility-driven administrative
proceedings.
At least two key concerns could particularly benefit from broader policy
attention through governmental legal structures: accounting for corporate deals in
resource and transmission planning, and equity in instrument design. Each is
considered below in turn.

174
See H.B. 2267, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 67-1501 (Va. 2015) (creating the Virginia
Solar Energy Development Authority “established for the purposes of facilitating,
coordinating, and supporting the development . . . of the solar energy industry and solar
energy projects by developing programs that . . . provide a hub for collaborating between
entities, both public and private, to partner on solar energy projects”); id. §67-1505(14)
(specifically directing it to assist “investor-owned utilities in the planned deployment of at
least 400 megawatts of solar energy projects in the Commonwealth by 2020. . . .”);
Renewable Energy Amendments, H.B. 297, 2017 Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017) (defining
“renewable energy tariff” to mean “a tariff offered by a qualified utility that allows the
qualified utility to procure renewable generation on behalf of and to serve its customers” –
the sleeved PPA concept).
175
See AEEI, OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5.
176
See id. at 13 (“The report identifies states with the greatest potential to expand
corporate access to advanced energy by assessing the regulatory and policy environment,
potential market size for corporate purchases, and renewable energy potential of all 50
states.”).
177
Id. at 5 (combining factors including a state’s regulatory regime, a state’s corporate
electricity consumption levels, and available renewable resource in the state).
178
Id. at 9–10. Rankings also provided for policies focused on access to distributed
generation. Id. at 11–13.
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D. Capacity and Transmission – Planning and Limitations
Effective planning for electricity infrastructure – generation facilities and
transmission lines – has long been challenging due to jurisdictional limitations and
siting and financing issues, among others. 179 Transmission lines needed to bring
electric power to population centers – especially long-distance transmission crossing
multiple states – often do not keep pace with new generation. Consider recent
transmission congestion in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), for example, where
wind has been developed faster than transmission capacity.180 As wind farms have
been built in western Kansas, the need for more transmission has increased.181
An ongoing multi-year, multi-state approval process for Clean Line Energy’s
proposed Grain Belt Express transmission project – approved in Kansas, Illinois,
and Indiana, and after years of litigation, in Missouri – epitomizes the regulatory
barriers to meeting transmission needs of new generation facilities.182 The trend in

179

The legal literature has addressed many aspects of these challenges. See, e.g., Ashley
C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of
the Public Interest in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
705 (2010) (addressing barriers to an evolving “public interest” state regulatory regimes for
transmission line approval and cost allocation); Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a
Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895
(2015) (comparing the centralized regulatory frameworks applicable to natural gas pipelines
with the fragmentation of transmission line siting and proposing a shift from state to regional
siting for transmission infrastructure).
180
See HIMALI PARMAR & SHANKAR CANDRAMOWLI, ICF, WIND IN SPP IS NOT SO
SIMPLE 1 (2017) (discussing pace of wind development in the SPP footprint and need to
address risk of generation curtailment and price distortion), https://www.icf.com/resources/
white-papers/2017/wind-in-spp-is-not-so-simple [https://perma.cc/R3TN-JVKT]; U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY xviii (2015)
(reporting congestion in the SPP and other Midwest regional markets “results from high and
growing levels of wind generation that cannot be delivered from the western side to more
distant, eastern loads, and the lack of additional transmission to enable further development
in renewable-rich areas”), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/2015%20
National%20Electric%20Transmission%20Congestion%20Study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C5K9-2NUJ]. The terms “transmission constraint” and “congestion differentiated,” refer to
“[a]n element of the transmission system . . . that limits power flow; An operation limit
imposed on an element . . . to protect reliability; or [t]he lack of adequate transmission
system capacity to deliver electricity from potential sources of generation . . . without
violating reliability rules[,]” and “situations where transmission constraints reduce
transmission flows or throughput below levels desired by market participants or government
policy,” respectively. Id. at viii–ix.
181
See Emma Foehringer Merchant, U.S. Wind Industry Frets as Major Transmission
Lines Stall, GTM (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/anargument-as-old-as-wind-the-transmission-conundrum#gs.o2FXC0Va [https://perma.cc/5V
37-4XG2].
182
See KAN. CORP. COMM’N, UTILITIES AND COMMON CARRIERS ANNUAL REPORT 13
(2018), http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/images/PDFs/legislative-reports/2018_Utilities_and_
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corporate demand for clean power contributes to these challenges with a high
number of privately contracted PPAs arising outside utilities’ traditional planning
process and RTO/ISO planning for new transmission lines across their regions. The
majority of states require integrated resource planning (IRP) – that is, the process of
forecasting energy demand and planning how it will be met with supply and demand
side resources183 – but large-scale corporate demand has not yet been accounted for
in this planning.184 This increases the chance of overbuilding generation capacity or
adding capacity that has not been well planned for, resulting in transmission
congestion of the sort that has been experienced in the SPP and elsewhere.
New green tariffs could help ameliorate this concern in traditionally regulated
states with IRP. To the extent the tariffs are well-designed to meet companies’ needs
better than private contracting, utilities, PUCs, and regional operators will be able to
incorporate new projects into the planning process.185 Numerous states, however,
including states with high renewable resources, still do not require IRP, relying on
traditional, supply-focused utility planning. 186 Thus, although decentralized
decision-making has some benefits, as growth in distributed generation and
corporate demand for clean power demonstrate, it is not a perfect match to existing
regulatory structures, which are slow to adapt.
There are good reasons why states should adapt resource planning to reflect
corporate demand, however. As the Center for the New Energy Economy (CNEE)
Common_Carriers_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC3K-KG9C]. Although the Grain Belt
Express eventually received final approval from the Missouri utility commission in early
2019, landowners and some state legislators continue in efforts to block the project through
eminent domain reform. For an informative account of the Grain Belt saga, see Jeffrey
Tomich, Mo. Lawmakers move to block $2.5B transmission line, ENERGYWIRE (Apr. 18,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060175537 [https://perma.cc/8GEMSSLP].
183
RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON. INC., BEST
PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING: EXAMPLES OF STATE
REGULATIONS AND RECENT UTILITY PLANS 4 (2013), http://www.raponline.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/rapsynapse-wilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JCM9-Q9UG].
184
See CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., PRIVATE PROCUREMENT, PUBLIC BENEFIT:
INTEGRATING CORPORATE RENEWABLE ENERGY PURCHASES WITH UTILITY RESOURCE
PLANNING 6 (2016), http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/private-procurement-public-benefitintegrating-corporate-renewable-energy-purchases-with-utility-resource-planning/ [https://
perma.cc/4LA6-JA42] (noting that “no states have yet taken a forward-looking approach to
planning around corporate renewable energy targets”).
185
See WRI, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 124, at 4 (showing states as of mid-2017
with successful tariffs as well as those that have failed to attract corporate buyers).
186
WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 183, at 5 fig.2 (depicting states with and without
IRP requirements); see also AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., INTEGRATED
RESOURCE PLANNING (2014), http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdf/policy-brief/irp-brief0714.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT5E-GSUN] (contrasting traditional utility planning with IRP,
which includes non-utility stakeholders and expands options for meeting demand to include
alternatives to new generation).
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recently explained in a white paper, to thoughtfully account for corporate renewables
could defer the need for utilities to plan new generation facilities that would be
charged to ratepayers.187 It would also avoid “dampening demand” with higher than
necessary fees on corporate procurement to protect impacts on other customers.188
Integrated planning can align state policy with private sector trends, and benefit from
the economic development possibilities they represent.189 To date, however, it does
not appear that any state has developed an effective approach to planning for
corporate renewable demand. 190 Here, CNEE concludes, state legislatures or state
agencies (an energy office, if there is one, or a commerce or economic development
authority) can “play a crucial role” in directing utilities and PUCs to adapt.191
A lack of planning to incorporate private renewable targets in public planning
may also implicate companies’ “100 Percent Renewable” claims. It extends the
concept of additionality, beyond just ensuring that a renewable energy project is new
and additional, to ask – can it consistently come online? Is there transmission
infrastructure sufficient to accommodate the new renewable capacity? If not, even
if a wind farm is built under a corporate PPA with a developer, the electricity it
generates may be curtailed due to transmission congestion or excess generation
capacity. Curtailment occurs when an RTO (or utility, if outside an RTO footprint)
orders a wind or solar generator to reduce the electricity generation at the facility
below what it would otherwise be able to produce.192 The most common reasons for
curtailment are transmission congestion, excess generation when demand is low,
lack of access to transmission or other technical issues with voltage, frequency, or
interconnection.193 Renewable energy curtailments create financial risk for parties
to a PPA,194 but also may undermine the legitimacy of renewable energy claims. Can
a company rightly assert it receives all its electricity from renewables – consistent
187

CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., supra note 184, at 7.
Id.
189
Id. at 7–8.
190
See id. at 6.
191
Id. at 12.
192
See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY
CURTAILMENT: EXPERIENCE AND PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60983.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SLW-XMNG].
193
Id.
194
See, e.g., Smoky Hills Wind Project II, LLC v. City of Independence, 889 F.3d 461
(8th Cir. 2018) (regarding a breach of contract claim under renewable energy agreement for
failure to pay for $330K in curtailment losses); Smoky Hills Wind Farm, LLC v. Midwest
Energy, Inc., No. 6:15–CV–1116–JTM–KMH, 2015 WL 3833378 (D. Kan. June 22, 2015)
(determining there was no federal jurisdiction over a contract dispute between parties to a
renewable energy purchase agreement centered on who would bear the $1.8M loss resulting
from involuntary curtailments between 2012–14); see also Eric Gimon et al., Renewables
Curtailment: What We Can Learn from Grid Operations in California and the Midwest,
GTM (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/renewablescurtailment-in-california-and-the-midwest-what-can-we-learn-from#gs.ZWOUFXI [https://
perma.cc/URA3-4NQS] (addressing efforts in MISO and CAISO to reduce curtailment
through operational changes).
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with additionality – if a project it counts toward its target is routinely being
curtailed? It is not clear how, if at all, the effect of curtailment has figured into
corporate buyers’ statements about clean energy goals. The potential for emissions
reduction benefits from adding clean energy to the grid where it may lead coal plants
to operate through self-commitment, as occurs in the SPP.195 If nothing else, the risk
of curtailment is yet another justification for incorporating corporate pledges into
state and regional planning.
E. Equity Considerations
In addition to the issues discussed above, green tariffs and related clean power
access mechanisms raise a number of equity considerations, as between new and
existing corporate buyers, and as between customer classes.
With any of these instrument designs, common questions arise: Will the new
green tariff be available only as an enticement to companies with new development
in the state, or will it also be available to existing commercial and industrial
consumers that want to shift their usage to clean power? Will a tariff be offered to a
defined class of customers or be issued case-by-case when a utility can strike a deal
on terms it considers favorable with individual corporate buyers? Will it be available
to small businesses as well as the large consumers driving the trend? Perhaps most
important, will tariff design avoid raising costs for others, especially residential
customers?
Case-by-case and negotiated approaches may be used in a way that seems to
offer preferential treatment to new corporate entrants to a state, even if the deal
struck between a utility and corporate buyer is cost contained. 196 Here again, it
becomes clear that such an arrangement implicates the broader policy questions that
could frame instrument design in this space. If the tariff is conceived purely as an
economic development tool, it may be structured to highlight benefits of low-cost
195

As the Energy Information Administration explains, “[i]n the SPP, unlike in other
regions, some coal-fired generators are operated similar to natural gas units and are used to
balance fluctuations in wind output through the day” when operators “self-commit” even
when the “market-clearing price” does not cover marginal costs for the plant. Like natural
gas, coal in the Southwest Power Pool is cycled to accommodate wind power, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37132
[https://perma.cc/M6F5-HR5U]. The EIA explains further, “Although this decision could
lead to a loss in revenue, a plant may choose to self-commit if the cost of restarting the
generating unit could exceed the cost of continued operation while taking the lower marketclearing price.” Id.
196
Such individual contracts need approval from utility commissions in traditionally
regulated states, in order to verify that the terms are not discriminatory or unduly preferential.
See, e.g., Application of Madison Gas and Electric Company for Authority to Offer a
Renewable Energy Rider 5-6, No. 3270-TE-102 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis. June 21, 2017)
(final decision), http://apps.psc.wi.gov/vs2015/ERF_view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=327993
(discussing role of utility commission in reviewing individual contracts)
[https://perma.cc/NA7P-LNQE].
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renewable energy for companies that agree to locate new facilities in the state. For
example, tariffs that accomplish a sleeved PPA for one large company may facilitate
a deal for a renewable energy project, providing access to renewables for that single
corporate buyer.197 Offering individualized green tariffs on favorable terms may be
an effective economic development strategy, from a state perspective, and more
insulation from changes in the market, from the utility perspective, but it may neglect
demand that exists among companies already operating within the state. By contrast,
if supporting renewable energy development is a state’s overarching goal, state
subscriber programs offer a structure to meet demand from new as well as existing
C&I consumers in the state.
These equity considerations should be key elements of green tariff design.
There are at least two ways in which green tariffs could increase costs for other
customers, if not managed appropriately in the tariff design. The AEEI notes (1) the
risk that a subset of customers may bear increased costs for maintaining a utility’s
existing generation and transmission facilities if corporate consumers are served by
a separate green tariff, and (2) the risk that costs associated with new projects under
a green tariff will be shared by customers who are not directly benefiting from it.198
The possibility that offering low-cost renewables to companies could shift costs
to residential consumers is a key concern for ratepayer advocates who participate in
PUC dockets evaluating green tariff proposals. They seek assurances that green
tariffs for business renewables will not create inequities between electricity
customer classes, with a particular interest in protecting residential and small
business consumers. For example, a recent proposal by Madison Gas and Electric
for a new renewable energy tariff allowing “nearly all commercial and industrial
customers to participate” raised cross-subsidization concerns from Wisconsin’s
utility commission staff and the Citizen Utility Board given that – based on
eligibility criteria – “more than 4,000 customers representing 68 percent of MGE’s
system sales would qualify.”199 At the same time, the Citizen Utility Board urged
that the program should make small businesses the priority, presenting an equity
concern based on size within commercial and industrial customer classes. To that
end, they sought broad eligibility to include smaller commercial consumers, but with
a cap (opposed by MGE and clean energy advocates).200 PUCs tend to be cautious,
197

See WRI, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 124, at 8.
ADVANCED ENERGY ECON. INST., MAKING CORPORATE RENEWABLE ENERGY
PURCHASING WORK FOR ALL UTILITY CUSTOMERS: DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR VOLUNTARY
RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRAMS 5 (2017), https://info.aee.net/making-corporaterenewable-energy-purchasing-work-for-all-utility-customers
[https://perma.cc/JUB4QMEG] [hereinafter AEEI, CORPORATE RENEWABLE ENERGY PRICING] (detailing eight
design features that utility commissions should include to ensure nonparticipants do not bear
costs of green tariffs).
199
Citizens Utility Board, Comments on Commission Staff Memorandum, on the
Application of Madison Gas and Electric Company for Authority to Offer a Renewable
Energy Rider, (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis. June 21, 2017) http://apps.psc.wi.gov/vs2015/
ERF_view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=305417 [https://perma.cc/4AGN-J6DG].
200
Id. at 7.
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requiring usage thresholds for eligibility or participation caps to ensure no cost
shifting to residential consumers occurs. In its final decision, the Wisconsin
commission approved the program as a framework for evaluating individual
customer contracts, requiring corporate consumers under the program to be
responsible for all costs associated with their agreement, imposing a limit on
participation to 25 MW of existing load, and preserving broad eligibility.201
Similarly, when Westar submitted the Direct Renewable Participation Service
Tariff to the Kansas Corporation Commission, the Citizens’ Utility Ratepayer Board
(CURB) intervened on the basis of concern that “rates paid and the services received
by residential and small commercial ratepayers may be substantially affected” by
the proposal.202 A staff analysis of this risk convinced the Commission that the new
tariff will not affect other customers, and if anything, would likely benefit other
customers indirectly.203 The Commission then approved the tariff for use with an
already identified project, but requires Westar to return for new approval for any
future facilities it may propose under the program.204
In what promises to be a closely watched proceeding, the New Mexico Public
Regulation Commission issued an order requiring Facebook to pay half the
transmission costs associated with access to a renewable energy facility it is pursuing
with the local utility under the state’s green tariff, for lack of evidence that the
transmission line would benefit retail customers. State economic development
officials warned of a “chilling effect” on corporate relations with the state, while a
utility commissioner countered, “it strains credulity that [the utility seeking approval
of the Facebook deal] would think we would accept its position without
evidence.”205
If a green tariff can provide access to low-cost renewables for large corporate
consumers, it begs the question - why should the same not be available to residential
customers? Advocates for corporate access to renewables respond to this objection
by emphasizing that any new facilities built to meet corporate demand are dependent
201

Approved MGE Renewable Energy Rider (Amend. No. 349), No. 3270-TE-102,
(Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis. July 25, 2017), http://apps.psc.wi.gov/vs2015/ERF_view/view
doc.aspx?docid=328585 [https://perma.cc/V3R6-C66N].
202
Westar Energy, Inc. and Kansas Gas and Electric Company for Approval of their
Direct Renewable Participation Service Tariff, No. 18-WSEE-190-TAR (Kan. Corp.
Comm’n Nov. 8, 2017) (petition to intervene and motion for protective order and discovery),
http://estar.kcc.ks.gov/estar/ViewFile.aspx/S20171108095214.pdf?Id=451a570a-f704-4a32
-9660-0709cb4dcdb4 [https://perma.cc/V6YH-YVCP].
203
See, e.g, Application of Westar Energy, Inc. and Kansas Gas and Electric Company
for Approval of their Renewable Participation Service Tariff, No. 18-WSEE-190-TAR (Kan.
Corp. Comm’n Docket June 7, 2018) (notice of filing of staff’s report and recommendation),
http://estar.kcc.ks.gov/estar/ViewFile.aspx/S20180607085619.pdf?Id=e54a86d9-08df-4c81
-b8d8-9663bdb55c52 [https://perma.cc/L8Y5-UX4P].
204
Westar Energy Approval, supra note 116.
205
See Kevin Robinson-Availa, PRC Decision Blindsides Facebook, State Officials
Warn, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.abqjournal.com/1304265/prcdecision-blindsides-facebook-state-officials-warn.html [https://perma.cc/8U3D-K3XT].
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on the scale of that demand and the capital it makes available to developers.206 In
addition, with effective design, AEEI argues a green tariff should be able to benefit
even non-participant customers – new renewable energy projects that result from
green tariffs “deliver a wider-reaching set of benefits, including infrastructure
upgrades, increased resource and fuel diversity, potentially lower electricity prices,
new tax revenue, and high-paying local construction and operation jobs.”207 In states
that have ratepayer boards, these advocates can play an important role in evaluating
design so that these benefits can accrue to all customers without increasing their
rates.
CONCLUSION
Like so many other aspects of this field, state level reforms for business
renewables confront recurring themes of energy law – inconsistent policy objectives,
piecemeal and increasingly decentralized policymaking, state variability, and the
continuing gap between generation and transmission planning. At the same time,
corporate demand and successful efforts to circumvent regulatory barriers
corresponds with the emerging trend of active electricity consumers wielding
influence in energy policy spheres.
From the perspective of the low-carbon transition, corporate renewable energy
deals have been important to continuing the growth trajectory for renewables as
federal energy policy refocused on fossil fuels. As this article has explained, how
much these companies’ clean energy goals will meaningfully advance the transition
depends on a range of factors, such as how fully companies move away from
unbundled RECs and stimulate new projects, but also how well existing governance
structures adapt to incorporate this increased demand, to minimize curtailment and
ensure equity among consumer classes.
Understanding “100 percent renewable” claims is especially important to
ensure that a false sense of accomplishment does not diminish the urgency for
continued low-carbon reforms, at all levels of government, but also within a
company’s own operations. New renewable energy will help cut carbon from
electricity, but the less glamorous cousins, energy efficiency and conservation on
the demand side, have the most direct connection to companies’ actual electricity
use. As Professor Eisen has observed, “demand response is hardly anyone’s idea of
the most exciting resource in a transformed electric grid.”208 Unlike clean energy,
which has captured the imagination of companies for all that it may represent – new
and advanced technology, cost savings, hope for the planet, corporate social
responsibility people can see – demand response represents a negative of “not energy
at all.”209 Nonetheless, FERC’s recent rulemaking enhances the potential of demand
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response to support a modern low-carbon grid, and corporate electricity
consumption has been particularly amenable to this model.
Likewise, renewable energy may be better for attracting companies to a state,
but energy efficiency programs, if well designed, can also help retain companies
important to a state economy.210 In Ohio, for example, American Electric Power’s
Business Incentive program was able to save auto parts manufacturer Nissin Brake
to reduce its energy consumption by over 800,000 kWh. 211 There is significant
variability with regard to how well state policy encourages energy efficiency
investments by utilities and consumers, particularly in commercial and industrial
classes, 212 yet the importance of this area cannot be overstated. Recent analyses
suggest aggressive efficiency measures have the potential to cut energy use in half
by 2050, compared with current trajectories, thereby reducing the need for new
generation facilities, renewable or otherwise. This outcome will depend on
improving efficiency broadly, across “existing factories, homes, commercial
buildings, electric transmission and distribution systems, and power plants” – a scale
of change that will need governmental support and would benefit from the kind of
demand companies are directing toward new renewables.213 There is still significant
policy work to be done across many states, especially in the area of ratemaking
reform, to enhance access to energy efficiency measures that would cut commercial
and industrial consumption. In much the same way that companies are driving
renewable energy growth through policy engagement at the state level, those that
are serious about emissions reduction should be at least as engaged on efficiency
policy reform.
As state energy law and policy continues to adapt to a changing energy sector,
the trend of corporate demand for clean power underscores the important role
consumers are playing at the state level, moving the US incrementally closer to a
modern low-carbon grid. Each state that advances policy in this space – whether
expanding access to large scale renewable energy, distributed generation, or energy
efficiency – offers a template for other states to evaluate, adapt, and improve upon
in ways that meet their own unique circumstances. This Article evaluates the trend
and state level responses at an early stage, and there is still a great deal of policy
innovation, and negotiation, to be done before the full impact of the trend can be
assessed. As state policy continues to develop in response to demand for renewable
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INDUSTRIAL OPT-OUT PROVISIONS (2016), http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/ieep-mythsfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV6U-88N6].
211
Id.
212
State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON., http://aceee.org/state-policy/scorecard [https://perma.cc/E73D-KVKH].
213
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., FACT SHEET: THE ROAD TO
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energy, states that effectively meet consumer needs, ensure equity across customer
classes, and situate measures within a coherent modern energy plan can provide the
best models for other states.

